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POLAND AND THE NEW EUROPE

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HUMANITY in a prolonged effort put efficient checks to the once popular fashion of cannibalism. Considering the means which were then at the disposal of humanity, the suppression of cannibalism was probably a more difficult and long drawn out task than will be the suppression of collective, wholesale killing. I believe that wars not only ought to disappear as a means of settling international disputes but that they will do so providing we can apply sufficient moral and physical pressure to combat the present tendency to fight. If the pessimists insist that the experiment of the League of Nations proves the futility of an attempt to bar wars, I reply that during the banquet given by the German General Staff on the day of the entry into Paris the hearts of French generals were not served *à la fourchette*, as they might have been on a similar occasion many years ago. If war-loving tribes have renounced their desire to eat the hearts of vanquished enemy chiefs—as was once a semi-religious rite—there is still hope that after a period of time they may also renounce the custom of the planned killing of their neighbours. If the first experiment with the League of Nations was unsuccessful, we ought to find out the faults in its mechanism, and then organize the second experiment.

If, being concerned with Poland and Central Europe, as I am, I begin with remarks about the League of Nations, it is because political isolationism belongs to the historical era already finished, and to-day one ought to approach the problem of each central-European nation in conjunction with the problems engaging the whole world.

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At the Peace Conference of 1919 two schools of thought were represented: the French, wishing to base the peace on such territorial changes and arrangements of control as strategic-

ally would leave no chance of success to any new German attempt of aggression; the Anglo-American, attempting to base the peace not so much on territorial changes of a strategical character as upon a system of rules of the League of Nations with membership of all states, including, after a short interval, also the aggressor states—Germany and Austria.

During the 1914-18 war, towards the end of 1917, the problem of rebuilding Poland became an essential factor in the Entente war aims. The statesmen of the Entente decided—in the interest of themselves as well as in consideration of historical justice—to create a strong Poland "as a buffer state to bar the way against the future advance of Germany in Russia and against the advance of Russian bolshevism in Austria or Germany."* The aim was clear and definite.

The Commission on Polish Affairs of the Peace Conference of 1919 was of opinion that the frontier between Germany and Poland was to coincide with the demarcation line between the German and Polish population, and Poland ought to receive the sovereignty over Danzig and East Prussia. The Commission shared the view that Poland ought to be made strong and large enough to be able to withstand the pressure of each of her neighbours—of Germany and of Russia. Here may be said in parenthesis that the events of 1920 proved the capacity of Poland to repel the Russian invasion. But the question of the Russian danger to Poland was treated on the margin of the deliberations of the Commission, whose main task was to draw the frontier between Poland and Germany. The Commission was of the opinion that Poland, when acting in co-operation with Czechoslovakia and not burdened with the threat of a German attack from East Prussia, would present a sufficient barrier to a blow from the West.

As we know, the Peace Conference rejected the proposal of giving to France her frontier on the Rhine as well as the unanimous opinion of its Commission on Polish Affairs to give to Poland the Sovereignty over Danzig and East Prussia. The French frontier was established far westward from the Rhine, Danzig was made a Free City, and East Prussia remained a German province. In this way the plan of organizing a new Europe on the basis of military considerations was torpedoed. What the Treaty of Versailles created instead, represented a crossbreed between strategical demands of security and leniency to German interests. Poland, instead of emerging as a strong fortress, appeared a strategical weakling.

*Prof. Charles Sarolea "Europe and the League of Nations," Bell. 1919, p. 162.

This result was visible from the very beginning. Already in 1919 a shrewd student of European politics wrote about new frontiers of Poland as follows: "There is no European state which has a worse geographical frontier." And again: "Poland . . . can only live if orderly and peaceful conditions prevail in Eastern Europe." And further: "So far from Poland being in a position to protect Europe either against Germanism or Bolshevism, it is Europe which will have to protect Poland from both external and internal dangers."*

Further events proved that the protection which Europe would and could exercise over Poland was, in the broad lines, equal to the protection which the League of Nations was able to give to any one of its members. But, at the moment when the Treaty was signed, the exact possibilities of the League for protection were not yet tested. Germany signed the Versailles Treaty with the firm resolve of dishonouring her signature given under pressure. If the Allies, declining to negotiate with Germany a peace of understanding, chose "a peace of violence" then they ought to have been logical and created conditions which would permanently keep in check smouldering designs of German revolt against dictated conditions of peace. But events did not keep pace with the demands of logic. The French frontier well to the west of the Rhine, the vulnerability of the new Poland, and the refusal of the United States to ratify the Treaty, opened the doors wide to German preparations for future revenge. The security of new Europe was placed upon quicksands. We know to-day that the Treaty of Versailles created a lasting atmosphere of political insecurity which poisoned all political relations, hampered the economic revival of Europe and was the hidden rock on which the international economic conferences between 1919 and 1938 all foundered.

Historians of the Paris negotiations in 1919 may differ as to the question who was responsible for rejecting the French scheme of organizing Europe. But volumes of their opinions could not change the simple fact that the original idea of the Allies' that of building a strong Poland, was not executed.

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If we consult the map of Europe before 1939, we shall see what in practice the refusal of the Peace Conference to give her the sovereignty over East Prussia meant to Poland.

It meant that in the interior of the northern area of Poland reaching almost to her heart, Warsaw, there was left a German

*Prof. Charles Sarolea "Europe and the League of Nations." Pp. 112, 162, 163.

territory of over 37,000 square kilometres which was nothing else but a fortified outpost of the Koenigsberg and Elbing strongholds. Aeroplanes leaving bases in the southern part of East Prussia could reach Warsaw within 15 to 20 minutes. In these circumstances every rational defence of West Poland against an attack undertaken from the neighbourhood of Berlin or Breslau was problematic inasmuch as the Polish military forces grouped parallel with the Vistula and facing West were exposed to an attack from the rear coming from East Prussia. However, this was not all. In view of the convention with Germany resulting from the Treaty of Versailles, and which guaranteed the transportation of German troops and of war material from and to East Prussia—the German army which in September, 1939, attacked the Polish troops from the rear and whose action was decisive in the German victory, was in its main body previously transported from Central Germany through Polish territory, with the co-operation of Polish railways and partly by Polish trains.

Here I shall appeal to the imagination of the reader. Let us suppose for a moment that in France the Departments of Pas-de-Calais, Somme and Oise situated between the sea and Paris, were transformed, by some miracle, into a German province, inhabited by a population 75 per cent. German, and that they became strongly fortified and used as a German *place d'armes*. What would be the prospect, in such a case, of defending Paris and what the security of France?

Yet, such was the fantastic kind of "security" given to reborn Poland by the Treaty of Versailles.

The Article of the Treaty of Versailles which left East Prussia under the sovereignty of Germany was responsible for that political and strategic nuisance, the "Polish corridor" which extended on the left bank of the Vistula river from the Polish town Torun through Bydgoszcz to Gdynia and the Baltic Sea. This "corridor," being populated by a great majority of Poles, who before the war of 1914 had elected only Polish deputies to the German Reichstag, would have never existed, were East Prussia dependent upon the Polish authorities as it was in the period of 1466-1657.

As we know in 1919 instead of the frontier on the Rhine, France received a promise of an Anglo-American guarantee. But Poland did not receive even a promise as a substitute for the strategically sound northern frontier which was rejected. She had to content herself with the observation that the Covenant of the League would provide for her security.

The way to security which the Covenant opened to its members since 1919 has been discussed in many commissions in and outside Geneva and in many learned books. Making a long story short, it remained doubtful if the way ever led to the goal. As the authors of the Covenant rejected the suggestion of Léon Bourgeois that the League is to be provided with a military force, all that remained behind the Covenant was the moral force of public opinion as represented by the Assembly. The chances of the League, as an agent enforcing international law, were from the very beginning the same as those of any single state in which the authority responsible for the maintenance of local law was deprived of its police force: law abiding citizens would run the risk of finding themselves at the mercy of gangsters tempered by the desire of private persons to take the law into their own hands. From the very day on which the Treaty of Versailles was signed far-seeing men warned the world that it was very risky to have made such an experiment on an international scale. When pro-German propaganda succeeded in preventing the adherence of the United States to the Versailles Treaty, the risk run by the League of Nations became still greater. As a matter of fact, its life was doomed before it started to manifest itself.

There is no doubt that in several domains, such as health matters, social legislation, economic and humanitarian questions the activities of the League resulted in tangible and valuable achievements. But it was not the case with its chief department—the machinery to prevent aggression. Here the history of the League records a succession of vain attempts to acquire some physical force to be employed against a possible aggressor. If to this be added the efforts on the part of League members, officials and friends to hide the helplessness of the League in this its main task—then the history of its twenty years existence will be well nigh complete.

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Now, it is safe to say that if the League of Nations survives this second World War, it will be only as the same name attached to a different organization.

What the victorious democracies will need is a world organization which will no more recognize the conception of a legal war. This new body will require to have the following organs: a military force sufficient to prevent acts of aggression; an international Law Court for the settlement of international disputes by peaceful proceedings; an extended International Labour Bureau; a new special Bureau charged

with the development of economic resources of the world, including measures against economic ills and disasters.

It remains an open question whether single states or federations of states will be represented in the future New League of Nations. It is difficult to judge to-day how far a federation of Great Britain—France—Holland—Belgium; or a Nordic federation; or a Balkan one are within the range of possibilities. But already now there are signs indicating that in the post-war Europe, a federation of states situated between the pre-war frontiers of Germany and Russia may come to be. Conversations since October, 1940, going on in London assure the future collaboration of Poles, Czechs and Slovaks. It is to be hoped that this nucleus will be joined by the neighbouring nations who have been helped by the events of the last twenty years and the present war to grasp the shortcomings of isolation, of neutrality and of the so-called sovereignty of small states. A block should be created of Poles, Slovaks, Czechs, Western Ukrainians; perhaps it will be possible to add Yugoslavia and Bulgaria to them; to this block ought to be invited non-Slav nations of democratic tendencies who live side by side with the Slavs and have often co-operated with them—Hungary, Rumania, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia. I think that at the end of this war Russia will not make any great difficulties in restoring territories occupied by her troops in September, 1939, and after; by taking them she succeeded in keeping the Germans for the duration of the war as far as possible from her frontiers. It is clear that only the situation created at the end of this war can give a practical basis for an idea of a Central European Union, but already to-day we may discuss its possibilities. If such a union becomes a reality, the ninety millions of its inhabitants would represent a sufficient weight to balance the pressure of Germany. Only such a Commonwealth of the Central European Nations would represent a solution which could assure safety and offer the best chances of economic development to its members. The New Commonwealth, or whatever name this block takes on—will enjoy the guarantee of the New League of Nations with its International Military Force. In exchange, the Central European Block would in the case of need put its resources at the disposal of the League.

If the future peace is to eliminate war from the territory of Europe (let us, for a beginning, speak of a territory smaller than the area of the whole world), the new international organization charged with the defence of international

law must be prepared more carefully and more thoroughly than any scheme of conquest has yet been planned. Leaving the considerations of the legal and economic sides of the problem for the present I want to add a few observations concerning the military aspect of the New League of Nations, as I consider this part of the problem very important.

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The fact that a new League supported by an International Military Force came into existence would not *ipso facto* mean that all strategic problems in post-war Europe would disappear with the signature of the new Covenant. If time proves that the spirit of security permeates the relations in Europe and that the New League of Nations is a success, the International Military Force will be reduced to a minimum, and the military aspect of post war problems will disappear just as the military problems of four hundred years ago concerning the frontier of England and Scotland have vanished. But between the end of the present war and the happy moment when the psychology and the political ideals of the Germans will become definitely peaceful, there will be an interval during which the New League of Nations will have to prove its efficiency. During this period the new European order has to be carefully watched. There exists an opinion that once the war is over the strategic value of frontiers will be a question of minor importance as the International Military Force will act as a guard against aggression. I consider this opinion erroneous. No one can guarantee that before her bellicose spirit definitely dies out, Germany will not be again afflicted by the mania of world domination. To deal with such a contingency the International Military Force ought to be equipped not only with the best military weapons, but also with the best bases for defence and attack. The laws of strategy remain constant irrespective of the fact whether the defence against aggression is to be carried on by an individual state or by an International Force. Those responsible for the effective working of a new League of Nations would make a mistake if they did not endow their executive force also with the best possible territorial conditions, And to create the best possible territorial conditions, means to create strategically sound frontiers.

Here I shall appeal again to the imagination of the reader. Let us take the map of Central Europe. The most marked features of the German eastern frontier are: in the north, beyond the Polish Pomorze—the political island of East Prussia; in the south-east—a comparatively narrow salient of German

Silesia stretching from Breslau to a territory in Czechoslovakia called by geographers "the Moravian Gate." For a moment let us suppose that the eastern frontier of Germany as it existed between 1919 and October, 1938, represents a temporary front of German armies at war with their eastern neighbours. Interpreted by, say, German Chief Command, the description of the front line will run as follows: "in the northern part of our eastern front, far beyond the enemy's lines, German forces succeeded in occupying large territory along the Baltic Sea between the rivers Vistula and Niemen. In the southern part of the front the German troops succeeded in making a large bulge extending over 120 kilometres to the south-east beyond Breslau, thus separating the Polish army from the Czech army."

If such a military situation as described in the above communiqué was created during a war—it would mean a definite success of the German army, extremely dangerous to the opposing forces. Now, *such a dangerous situation did exist during twenty years before the outbreak of this war.* If the same frontier line is to remain after this war is over, it will mean that in the event of a new friction the International Military Force will be, from the very beginning of the tension at a serious strategical disadvantage on this front.

I do not think that we have the right to place such a risk on the shoulders of the executive of the New League. Both the German bastion in the north (East Prussia) as well as the spearhead of the German Silesian corridor in the south-east ought to be liquidated. Otherwise it would be incorrect to say that the organizers of the post-war Europe did everything in their power to avoid the risks of another war.

Frederick the Great says in his memoirs: "Silesia—that is the road to the heart of Austria. It cost me three bloody wars, but I would not give her up even if I had to spill ten times as much blood, as Silesia is also the road to the greatness of Prussia." Unless this offensive strategic corridor leading to the Moravian Gate is definitely blocked the Prussian menace will continue to dominate the politics of Europe.

GENERAL FRANCO AND THE AXIS

By E. Allison Peers

HOW near is Spain to throwing in her lot with the Axis? Many people would like to know that—and possibly none better than the leaders of the Axis itself. For eighteen months, despite alternate inducements and threats, the nature of which can be gathered from press and radio statements made in Berlin and Rome, General Franco has held the Dictators at arms' length and refused to join hands, in any practical sense, with either. For half that time, too, he has been not precisely a "neutral," but, in the words of his own official declaration of June 12, 1940, a "non-belligerent"—just as Italy was for the first nine months of the War. Yet, though opponents of his régime, who had all the time been expecting him to join the Axis, announced last June that his entry into the War might now be expected at any moment, the chances of Spain's voluntary intervention seem more remote to-day than at any time since the War began. It is much more likely that Germany will invade Spain and meet with active and not perhaps ineffective resistance than that she will get her as an ally, while the probability that she will let her alone and that Spain will continue to be a non-combatant is still greater.

Since last September, however, there have been three independent conferences, as well as one group of conferences, between representatives of Spain and of the Axis, all details concerning which, save for the most insignificant and superficial ones, have been kept as a close secret. About each of them, as it took place, there was naturally a great deal of speculation, though only the frailest of foundations existed on which speculation could build.

I.

When it was first announced, early in September, 1940, that General Franco's brother-in-law, Don Ramón Serrano Súñer, Minister of the Interior, and political chief of the National Party, was going to Berlin to meet the German Führer, opinion in Spain regarded the event as almost a formality, whereas

opinion in Britain interpreted it as a preliminary to the blowing-up of a new crisis.

The Spanish view was the more balanced of the two and it was a pity that the British Press should have worked itself up into such a state of excitement, which made it look almost as foolish as the Axis propagandists when no such " spectacular development " as the latter predicted took place and the conversations led to no discernible result at all. Actually this visit of Sr. Serrano Súñer had been planned, and even announced as likely to take place in the near future, as long previously as the summer of 1939, when an official visit to Italy had been paid by the same statesman and returned with notable promptness by Count Ciano. Subsequently, Spain was given to understand that the outbreak of war had prevented Herr Hitler from pressing his invitation, but the War had not hindered other statesmen from visiting Germany and the attitude of Spain to the postponement was undoubtedly a questioning one. The Nazi-Soviet pact, the resulting invasions of Poland and Finland and subsequently the Nazi invasion of the Low Countries all estranged unofficial Spanish sentiment from Germany and led to the expectation, or even the hope, that the visit would not be paid. When, therefore, early in September, 1940, the appointment was announced of a Spanish mission to Germany of imposing size and distinguished composition, there was no feeling in Spain that any events of particular importance were likely to result from it.

So much longer and farther-reaching were the conversations than had been expected, however, that before Sr. Serrano Súñer returned to Madrid, three weeks later, Spain's attitude to them was a very different one. Briefly, what happened was this. The mission arrived at Berlin on September 16, and almost immediately its leader had a long conversation with Herr Hitler. The upshot of this conversation was such that Herr von Ribbentrop went off post-haste to Rome, whence, after interviewing the Duce, he had telephone conversations with the Führer. Meanwhile the Spanish Minister was being entertained with a conducted tour through Northern France and Flanders, where he was allowed to view the preparations being made for the destruction of Britain. By September 22 his hosts were ready for him again at Berlin, where he found, not only Hitler and Ribbentrop, but Ciano. After a week's stay, he left—not for Madrid, however, but for Rome, where he was at once received by Signor Mussolini. It was then stated in the Press that he would return to Madrid, but, in fact,

his visit, which was originally to have lasted for only forty-eight hours, was prolonged to nearly a week. The reason for the extension seems to have been the meeting of Duce and Führer on October 4 at the Brenner Pass, for, immediately this was over, the Spanish envoy received a visit from Count Ciano, who had gone with Mussolini to the Brenner, after which he at once flew home.

A fortnight after his return to Madrid, Sr. Serrano Súñer exchanged his portfolio of the Interior for that of Foreign Minister.

From this account of the first of the Spain-Axis conversations several things stand out clearly, while other broad deductions may be made with some confidence. Evidently, the meetings were from the first arranged for the discussion of definite proposals, and not, as had originally been deduced from the fact that they were so long overdue, for a general exchange of views. It was to be expected that the proposals would come from Berlin, but hardly that the Spanish reply to them would involve the dispatch of an envoy to Rome and the return to Berlin with him of Count Ciano. The natural inferences would be that Sr. Serrano Súñer's reply was not wholly satisfactory to his host; that the junior partner, on being consulted, decided that his Foreign Minister had better go to Berlin and try to make him see reason; that, this failing (despite the impressiveness of the conducted tour), the Spanish Minister was prevailed upon to hear the arguments of the Duce himself; that the Duce, having already an appointment with the Führer, then took the opportunity of reporting progress, if any; and that, finally, the two Dictators sent him back to Spain with a message for the Caudillo.

Only one subject, it would seem, could possibly justify such a long series of comings and goings at such a time. It had just been made clear to Hitler that Britain would not be subdued as easily as he had hoped and that a 1941 campaign would be unavoidable. As a part of this campaign Hitler must have envisaged an attempt to close the Western Mediterranean (he may be doing so still) and have asked for Spain's co-operation in the shape of a passage through the country for German troops, possibly also the use of the coast of Spanish Morocco and conceivably even active collaboration in an attempt to close the Straits. The Spanish leader's reply to such a request would of course have begun with a reminder of the fact—emphasized throughout by the Spanish Press though discounted by the Press of Germany and Italy—that he was only a Minister and

leader of the National Party—not a plenipotentiary, and still less a Dictator. So much would have been expected and conceded; but he could hardly have failed to give the fullest and most convincing reasons why, with all the good will in the world, Spain could not possibly enter the War. Leaving out reasons which could be more tactfully put to Sir Samuel Hoare than to Herr Hitler, he might have pleaded the appalling shortage of bread, of other vital foodstuffs, and of raw materials; the treaty signed in March, 1939, with Portugal (one of the most statesmanlike of General Franco's measures), subsequently strengthened by the signing of a protocol; the fact that all Spaniards were not Phalangist in sympathy, and that the Traditionalists, to say nothing of those who looked askance at the entire régime, would be bitterly opposed to war; and the Carlist and Traditionalist affiliations of a large part of the Army, including leaders who are credited with the intention of revolting if Spain should intervene in the War from any other motive than the defence of her own territory.

Such an answer as this would undoubtedly need to be communicated in detail to the Duce, especially if Sr. Serrano Súñer should have added that what Spain did mean to do, and to do soon, was to complete the occupation of Tangier, the first step towards which had been taken in the preceding June. Whether Count Ciano came to Berlin to point out that Italy desired direct or indirect control of Tangier, or to exert additional pressure, in the presence of Hitler, on the subject of a Western Mediterranean campaign, is uncertain. But, if our main assumption is correct, it would seem that Sr. Serrano Súñer felt bound to put fully before Mussolini himself the points he had made to Hitler: they were too vital and too conclusive to be conveyed, as Germany was content that they should be in the first place, through an intermediary. Further, they were important enough to merit discussion by the two Dictators.

No doubt a number of other subjects were raised in these conversations. The Press in Germany and Italy asserted that chief among them was a "New Order in Africa"—and the post-war partition of French Morocco and other parts of Africa among the conquerors and their satellites would be an attractive theme to broach after an inspection of the preparations made to bring about Britain's fall, though well-informed correspondents have suggested that the Führer's aim here was to damp Italian and Spanish hopes rather than to encourage them. The much-talked-of "Catholic-Latin *bloc*" would no doubt have entered into the conversations with Mussolini,

while Hitler, with his avaricious eye on Hispano-America, is believed to have been constantly inciting Spain to work there in a pro-Axis direction.

One further conclusion may quite safely be drawn from these happenings. By his conduct of this mission Sr. Serrano Súñer enhanced his reputation with General Franco and his Ministers, and probably also with the Dictators: otherwise he would hardly have been given the portfolio of Foreign Affairs with such marked promptness after his return. Pro-British Spaniards have suggested that the chief object of this change was to get rid of Colonel Beigbeder, who was none too fond of the Axis, and had too many ideas about Morocco, which he knew intimately, to be acceptable to Berlin and Rome. There may be something in this, but I incline to the alternative explanation, as being the more natural, and as fully borne out by later events. All the available evidence suggests that Sr. Serrano Súñer is strongly pro-Axis, while General Franco is doing his best to maintain a reasonable objectivity.

II.

Whether conciliatory or threatening, the message sent to General Franco from the Brenner certainly took rapid effect. Only two or three days after his chief lieutenant's promotion, General Franco himself, apparently at short notice, journeyed to Hendaye, and, on October 23, had a conversation with Herr Hitler, who had been doing a little business with M. Laval in German-occupied France on the day before, and was to do a little more with Marshal Pétain on the day after. Once again, the strictest secrecy was kept as to the nature of the interview. "We know absolutely nothing," observed the Phalangist newspaper *Arriba* with delightful pomposity, "about what words might have been exchanged by the two great creators of history."

When, however, a series of long and intricate conversations with a subordinate is followed by a short single conversation, in the presence of that subordinate, with his chief, it is pretty clear that the latter has come to confirm or amplify the statements of the former, especially when he has just promoted him. Presumably, then, the Führer heard at Hendaye much what he had heard in Berlin; possibly, at the same time, he repeated offers, persuasions or threats, but, so far as can, at present, be seen, these had no more effect upon General Franco than they had had upon his Minister.

On November 3, Spain took over Tangier. This, with the

other guaranteeing parties either engaged for the moment elsewhere or incapacitated, was a move that could be made with impunity. A fortnight later, Sr. Serrano Súñer travelled to Berchtesgaden, and had two conversations with Herr Hitler—one alone and one with Count Ciano. As no further conversations took place, except that the Foreign Minister had an unusually long interview with General Franco on his return, it may be assumed that the subject of the Berchtesgaden conference was not of transcendental importance. Sr. Serrano Súñer may well have gone simply to give Herr Hitler an account of the occupation of Tangier and its diplomatic repercussions and to discuss with him the future of the zone. This would have necessitated the presence of the Italian Minister.

For the next three months Spain held no more conversations with the Axis and fears that she would allow herself to be drawn into the War began gradually to subside. There were two moments in 1940 when the danger was greatest. One was in June: France, hitherto the great obstacle to Spain's intervention, was prostrate; Hispano-Italian relations during the past nine months had been growing more and more intimate; and most Spaniards seem to have assumed that, with the fall of France, the War was as good as over. The other was in September and October: the Axis was still believed in Spain to be sure of victory; Italy had overrun British Somaliland, had invaded Egypt and was talking glibly of Alexandria and the Suez Canal; what Hitler had staked and lost over Britain was not yet generally realized. On the material side, it was undoubtedly the proximity of famine that kept Spain from coming into the War at the heels of Italy, though I doubt if in any case the Spaniards, with their high ideals of honour, would have tolerated the stabbing of their prostrate neighbour merely in the hope of getting a larger share of the problematic booty: even had General Franco wished to do so (which there is no reason to assume) it would not have paid him to risk dividing his people and jeopardizing the future of his own régime. Perhaps the temptation was greater in October, especially if there were definite promises of prizes. At any rate, with clear indications that an Axis victory would be impossible before the spring, Spain was in a better position to make terms. However, though the harvest was in, it was not a good one, and wheat, out of sheer necessity, would still have to be imported in large quantities. Then there were the Portuguese complications, to say nothing of the slowly dawning possibility that the struggle might, at best, be inconclusive, as, before the Nazi

successes of May and June, 1940, General Franco had openly prophesied that it could not fail to be. He simply could not go wrong if he remained a non-combatant and contented himself with Tangier and expectations of Gibraltar. If he took the plunge on the Axis side, he had a chance of coming out a winner, but it was more than possible that, before this could happen, he might have to face crises—blockade, famine, disunity, revolution—in which his allies would be unable to help him. So, having made his choice with the prudence that, whatever his other failings, always characterizes him, General Franco settled down to play the rôle of a non-combatant and a reasonably good neutral.

In that rôle we may hope with some confidence that he will continue. No doubt he will go on exchanging Crosses and Grand Collars of Orders of Merit with the Axis Powers and assure them of his " complete solidarity " with them in all they stand for. No doubt his Ministers will go a little farther and inform the Nazis that they have not only the same ideals (in spite of the Nazi pact with the New Spain's sworn enemy) but the same enemies. No doubt, from time to time, newspapers, irresponsible crowds and gangs of rowdy students will go farther still. But let one who has long been closely acquainted with Spanish psychology assure any who read of these incidents with natural regret and perhaps resentment that little or no significance need be attached to them. They are what Spaniards often describe as " façade." Words, to the Spaniard, are frequently a kind of protective covering in which he wraps himself tightly at times when he is not quite sure how to act. Courtesies, in international as in personal relationships, are formulæ, intended, not to be pressed home too literally, but to convey a general indication of friendliness. I have often found a genuine good will in Spaniards not far beneath a seething and even violent surface of uncharitable talk. It is galling to British readers of the Spanish press to find Axis propaganda reproduced everywhere and almost complete silence observed as to the repeated and effective efforts which Britain is making, in the very hour of her own greatest need, to aid the rehabilitation of a people by whose side, just over a century ago, she fought against just such an unscrupulous invader as she is fighting to-day. But, quite apart from the fact that a controlled Press speaks *to*, rather than *for*, a nation, such protestations and such silences are almost devoid of significance. It is only when Spain acts that she can, by her own standards, be fairly judged.

III.

It was decidedly as a good neutral rather than as a mere "non-belligerent" that Spain was appealed to by Italy in the early days of February, 1941. Since the Duce's October meeting with Sr. Serrano Súñer in Rome a great change had come over his fortunes. His incursion into Egypt had not progressed beyond its timid beginnings when, early in December, General Wavell started the great push which in two months drove Italy out of "the parts of Libya about Cyrene" and cost her immense quantities of material and over 100,000 men. An attempted invasion of Greece, begun at the end of October, had soon turned into a Greek invasion of Albania, bringing reverses of which Spain took full note, though the Spanish Press considerately reported them on back pages and continued to refer euphemistically to "the war in Greece." With the new year came the beginnings of the Italian evacuation of Somaliland, Eritrea and Abyssinia. To all these defeats had to be added resignations and other losses from the High Command; the destruction of warships, not only on the sea ("our sea") but in their harbours; heavy casualties in "our air" (for the Italian Air Force had once considered itself invincible) and on the ground; unrest in Italian cities and the penetration of German troops and aircraft to deal with potential revolution and to give such help as was practicable without interruption of the Germans' own plans. Nor was this all—but it was enough to justify General Franco in holding his head high on February 12, as he went to Bordighera at Mussolini's invitation. Whatever the Duce was about to propose, it could hardly be that he should follow his own ill-starred example of eight months before and forsake non-belligerency for war against Britain.

It might have been supposed, indeed, that the object of the Duce's invitation was to ask General Franco to negotiate with Britain for a separate peace were it not that such a move, if it took place, would certainly be made under conditions of the closest secrecy so as to keep knowledge of the negotiations as long as possible from an irate Führer. The spectacle of the Spanish Caudillo leaving his country for the first time (apart from the day on which he stepped across his frontier to meet Hitler) since his assumption of power and making a journey, openly and publicly, with his Foreign Minister, along the French and Italian Rivieras, was quite sufficient to disarm theories about a peace move.

Nor could Mussolini's apparently urgent invitation be likely to have had in view a request for a free passage through Spain for shiploads of Italians or divisions of Germans to Gibraltar. Whatever reasons the Spaniards might have urged against this in October had become trebly potent by now, and what they had refused the conqueror of France and the "protector" of half Europe, they would hardly grant the impotent bully who had been beaten in Africa and Albania and was now threatened with worse defeat still. He may have made an appeal *ad misericordiam* for aerial and naval bases, but the lack of offensive spirit at present discernible among the Italians makes the suggestion an unlikely one.

The key to the problem is no doubt supplied by General Franco's meeting at Montpellier on the next day (February 13) with Marshal Pétain. The French *chef d'état*, who in June, 1940, had gone to the aid of his distressed country straight from the French Embassy at Madrid, had long been a close personal friend of the Caudillo, who had acted as intermediary in the French armistice negotiations with Germany. If the Duce wanted anything from the Marshal, with whom he was technically still at war, he would be more likely to get it *via* Spain than *via* Hitler, who was apparently finding it difficult enough to get from him what he himself wanted.

There seems little doubt that what the Duce wanted was assurance of French help if and when his armies should be beaten back through Tripoli to the borders of Tunisia. True, General Wavell might not think it advantageous to pursue the Italians thus far, but, if he did so, they would have little hope, in their demoralized state, of being able to hold him. A similar problem was the evacuation of Italians from Abyssinia, which Nemesis and the armies of a genuine Empire seemed to be about to return to its rightful owners. For this purpose the use of the Jibuti railway, and hence of French Somaliland, would be essential.

Possibly the request to intercede with Marshal Pétain was preceded by a discussion as to the eventual division of French territory in Africa between Spain and Italy—a subject on which Mussolini may have developed considerable misgivings since October. As he could hardly hope now to have a voice in future partition, such a discussion would be academic.

It looks at present as if the centre of interest in Spain's relations with the Axis is likely to shift from Irún, Port Bou or even Gibraltar to Morocco. From one point of view Spain is well placed in Africa. Of the four key positions which

dominate the Straits of Gibraltar she now holds three—Tarifa, Tangier and Ceuta. She would thus be drawn into the thick of any tussle for the western gate of the Mediterranean, and her active collaboration, were she to proffer it, would be welcomed by either party. But, important as Morocco is to her, and surrounded there, as she is, by French possessions and zones of French influence, she is bound to hold herself continually on the alert for new developments in France. The entry of Italian forces into Tunisia would be a breach of the Franco-German armistice which might well lead to a revolt in France's African colonies against Vichy. At any time, too, German pressure upon the Vichy Government may become intolerable, and Marshal Pétain's Government may abandon unoccupied France and raise the standard of revolt in Africa. At any time, for that matter, part or all of French Morocco may declare for General de Gaulle, in which event Spanish Morocco would have belligerents for its neighbours as Spain had until last June. Here, perhaps, or in the provoking of a quarrel with Britain over Tangier, may be Mussolini's secret hope of bringing Spain into the conflict. He may even be envisaging the outbreak of a Moroccan civil war.

Except for the fact that French Africa is divided in its allegiance and indications that the division is likely before long to become sharper, we are now in the region of pure speculation, of which there was more than sufficient about Spain during the Spanish Civil War. Those who prophesied in 1938 that German and Italian troops would never leave Spain, that in any European War Hitler would force Spain to join him, that Spanish naval and aerial bases were already in German hands, that the Balearic Islands had been ceded to Italy, must feel disinclined to try their hand further. What we can assert is that for eighteen months Spain has remained a non-combatant, and shows no sign of abandoning that position. We may be sure that she will fight, against whatever odds, if an attack is make upon her territorial integrity. We may hope that no such attack will be made, so that she may be able to continue the hard task of national reconstruction in the midst of a world at war.

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NEUTRAL SWEDEN

By R. O. G. Urch

SWEDEN'S " neutrality " has been and still is the frequent butt of caustic remark in neighbouring countries and, indeed, in Sweden itself. There was none to cavil when this policy was proclaimed in connection with the German war, but the Soviet-Finnish conflict towards the end of 1939 produced a new situation with a new war on Sweden's doorstep. The chiefs of the four Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Norway, Finland, and Denmark) had met in Stockholm on October 18 when the storm against Finland was brewing in the Soviet Union, and the general impression was that the four had decided to present a united front against aggression from that quarter. When the Red Army invaded Finland, however, disappointment was felt by many a man in the street because neither Sweden nor the other Scandinavian States sent their armed forces to meet the aggressor. Apart from volunteers and other forms of assistance, the men of Finland had to fight the enemy alone until hostilities ceased on March 13. One month later both Denmark and Norway were invaded, and here too the arms of Sweden did not come to aid.

The popular mind, prone to simplification, registers black marks against Sweden chiefly on the evidence of these main facts, feeling that Sweden has let her Nordic partners down. The position is not simple, however, and rarely if ever before have statesmen in Scandinavia been called upon to wrestle with problems of such vital and baffling complexity as those which have harried the ministers of Sweden since the end of 1939.

Rightly or wrongly, the countries of Scandinavia had all adopted " neutrality " as their determined policy in regard to the German war. When the four Chiefs met at Stockholm in October to discuss the menace from the Soviet Union, the enthusiastic Press in all four countries unjustifiably gave the impression that something tantamount to a Scandinavian alliance had been arranged. This was not true, for it can now be stated that Finland was advised she could not count on military help from Sweden. The policy of neutrality which

had been proclaimed concerned, however, only the war which began in Poland. Though military help could not be given by the Swedish State, Sweden never declared herself neutral in the Soviet-Finnish war. The reason usually given for not marching against the Red Army is that Sweden could not thus have helped Finland so much as by remaining non-belligerent, for Germany would have seized the opportunity to attack and overrun Sweden. The intentions of Germany were not known at the outset, and some still hold the opinion that if Sweden had ranged herself *immediately* by the side of Finland without waiting for hints or warnings, Germany would not at that stage have actively interfered. But the Swedes maintain that even in that case the practical aid to Finland would have been insufficient to win the war. The fact appears to be that the Red Army was expected to overrun the Finnish defences in a few weeks, if not days.

Whether the decision to proclaim Scandinavian neutrality was right or wrong, wise or unwise, consistent or inconsistent with obligations to the League of Nations, is a debatable question. Mistake or no mistake, subsequent lapses and apparent lapses by Sweden spring from this decision. The men in power claim to have pursued this policy in the interests not indeed of Britain and France nor of Germany, but primarily of Sweden and secondly of Scandinavia as a whole, with which the destinies of Sweden are inseparably bound both by blood and geography. The result is that none of these parties is satisfied—unless it be Sweden herself where the view prevails that in spite of superficial appearances the prosecution of this policy has not been unduly selfish and that in the long run it will be seen to have served the interests of real Scandinavian solidarity far better than would have done a headlong rush into the fray with the result that the whole of Scandinavia would have been overrun by foreign troops. Sweden has escaped this fate, and though German pressure here is a very real thing, it is an exaggeration to say that by shaking her mailed fist Germany can do what she likes at present in Sweden, notwithstanding the fact that Sweden has yielded more than once to pressure. There may have been doubt at times whether Sweden would fight at all in any circumstances against Germany if put to the test; but by the end of 1939 few competent observers can have held this view. Sweden will not easily be forced much further on the road of concession to German demands and the average Swede is convinced that if Germany attacks Sweden with her forces, Sweden will fight.

"What is then this Nordic Unity, this Scandinavian solidarity which did not bring the arms of Sweden to succour her bleeding partners?" is a question asked by travellers who observe that the present standard of welfare is much higher in free Sweden than in free Finland—the case of Denmark and Norway is not so easily compared, as they are not free. "Why, if Sweden will not fight, does she not at the least share out the good things she still has in relative plenty? What has Sweden done to support her Scandinavian neighbours?"

It is easy to obtain information on these points, yet it is not widely known. Swedes may be either poor at publicity or too proud to advertise their charitable deeds. I learnt casually a few days ago that my landlady in Stockholm had an adopted child in Finland. She had never mentioned it, though we had chatted daily for months and often discussed conditions in Finland. I found that she had never seen the child, but had picked him out from a photograph of a family of four. The mother was a poor war-widow, and within a few days the remaining three had been adopted by Swedish friends of my landlady. I found that contact for this sort of adoption was established by a special Swedish "Save the Children" society, active throughout the country, and that the response had been surprisingly great, the usual practice being for a Swedish man or woman to adopt a Finnish child for one year, undertaking to support it fully for this period. A great number of Swedish towns and villages have also adopted towns and villages in Finland, making it a self-imposed duty to help their recovery in manifold ways.

It was believed that private initiative for humanitarian aid on a large scale would not work in Sweden, that effective and adequate help could be rendered only behind the Government's lead. Yet, as soon as the war broke out against Finland, when spontaneous attempts were made all over the country, contributions in money and in kind poured in. Before the first anniversary of the outbreak of war these known gifts had amounted to 145,629,200 Swedish Kronor (£8,642,000). To this must be added the extensive cash and goods credit—given without any talk of conditions for repayment, much if not all being regarded as a not improbable loss—and the total exceeds 500,000,000 Swedish Kronor (£30,000,000) for Finland alone, no mean contribution from a country with a population of 6,341,000. The collection of money which began on many initiatives became concentrated in one organization called the *Nationalinsamling för Finland*, playfully alluded to in the

Press as "Sweden's greatest Beggar," with the proud boast that it was never turned away from any door. It collected 39,000,000 Swedish Kronor, and among the thousands who worked for it, all gave their services free of payment, except fifteen. The "Central Finland Help" took contributions mostly in kind, and they reached 30,000,000 Sw. Kr. Swedish industry gave 66,000,000 (of which 59,000,000 was in cash). Thus, of the 145 million collected these three organizations produced 135 million, the remainder being contributed by various organizations, the Red Cross, newspapers, the National Opera and clubs.

The invasion of Norway in April brought Sweden nearer the brink of war, nearer active participation, indeed, than the average man in Sweden knew, and for weeks it was touch and go. Germany informed Sweden of her motives for occupying and "protecting" Norway and Sweden was promised to be left undisturbed if she remained passive, did not mobilize her army, and did not help the Norwegians to resist, to which the Swedish Government replied to the effect that she had no intention of provoking a conflict but reserved to herself the right to act as an independent State.

As the fighting went on in Norway, the Germans asked, first unofficially then officially, for transit facilities through Swedish territory, which the Swedish Government twice refused. They had already refused a Norwegian request for materials. There is no reason to doubt the official statement that between April 9 and June 10 no soldiers passed through Swedish territory to Norway. Seven groups of medical men and their male assistants, altogether 292 persons, were allowed through to North Norway, however, as well as Red Cross materials and some foodstuffs, partly for the civilian population. Definite charges were made by people who claimed to have seen Swedish railway trucks laden with war materials in Norway. This may have been true, and it is explained that in the course of ordinary traffic there are always some Swedish trucks in Norway, and there was nothing to prevent the Germans from using these for transporting their military supplies.

Though it was not generally known at the time it has since been admitted that, on private Norwegian initiative, a proposal was made through Sweden that the Germans should leave the North of Norway to the Norwegians, a dividing corridor from Sweden to the town of Narvik being temporarily occupied by the Swedes. The Germans are said to have been willing to discuss the suggestion at first, but official Norway would not

consider it. Later the Norwegians appeared inclined to regard it more favourably, but when the Germans were approached again they gave no reply. The British and French withdrawal from the Narvik area relieved Sweden of a difficult problem, removing as it did the immediate menace of war.

Soon the Germans repeated their demands for transit facilities, this time in a categorical form, and the Swedish Government gave way. This lapse is the most serious one the Government has had to defend, and there are Swedes who still cannot speak of it with equanimity. The defence offered is that since there were no longer any military operations in Norway, it made no practical difference to the Norwegians whether German supplies reached them by sea or through Sweden. The aspect of how these facilities for Germany affected the Allied cause scarcely figures in the defence. The fact is that the Swedish Government yielded to direct pressure and the forced concession to Germany does not tally with the conception of strict neutrality. When the point is raised that Sweden had refused to allow the transit of Allied troops to aid Finland, the reply is that the aid available would have been inadequate to secure a Finnish victory, that it would indeed have thrown the whole of Scandinavia into the European war, as Germany would certainly have made an active attempt on Swedish soil to hold up the Allied troops. The Allied offer of help, though appreciated in Finland, was interpreted there as it still is in Sweden as dictated by the prospects of some undefined advantage expected to be gained thereby in the major war, rather than by altruistic readiness to help Finland.

But, regrettable as was Sweden's transit agreement, there is no need to magnify its practical effect. It stipulated that unarmed German soldiers returning home from Norway, particularly those going on leave, should be allowed to travel in special carriages through Sweden in both directions, as well as all kinds of freight, including war materials for which special licences would be given. Freight would be subject to Swedish customs control, and trains conveying German soldiers would be furnished with Swedish military guards. Furthermore, German soldiers (not necessarily unarmed) and military materials might pass through Swedish territory by railway in transit from one part of Norway to another, i.e. between South and North Norway, thus avoiding the more dangerous sea-route. The amount of material transported under this agreement is not generally known, but the Swedish authorities state that by the beginning of November, the

number of German soldiers going homewards through Sweden exceeded by 7,000 the number of those who travelled in the opposite direction.

Despite the strong call of blood, Swedish help to Norway was far more difficult than to Finland; for Germany, the country which checked Sweden's impulses, was itself the aggressor, not merely the friend of the aggressor. War materials, including aeroplanes and guns, had been sent to Finland in quantities which seriously reduced Sweden's own defences, to say nothing of the 10,000 volunteers and their equipment which were in action in Finland at the end of the war. Nothing of this kind could be sent to Norway, and all practical help had to be of a humanitarian nature. This was largely given through the medium of the Swedish Red Cross, whose President, Prince Carl (brother of the King of Sweden) has given an account of what had been done by October 21, 1940. This shows that 4,500,000 Sw. Kr. (£266,000) had been collected—a small sum, compared with what collections yielded for Finland. The explanation is not merely that Norway came after Finland, when Sweden had already made a great effort, but also that Norway was an occupied country and more than her surplus supplies of food and clothing were going to Germany or being used for the benefit of Germans in Norway. It was felt that contributions might go directly to Norwegians but indirectly they would benefit the Germans, just as humanitarian help from America to other occupied countries would do. One of Sweden's specialities presented both to Finland and Norway in great numbers is standard wooden dwelling-houses, made completely in sections and transported to their destinations, where they are quickly erected to replace houses destroyed by war. These gifts are much appreciated in both countries.

It should be observed, however, that private contributions have been restricted in some measure by the various and very careful organs of administration in Sweden, which check the exodus of commodities whose supplies show signs of depletion below the level required for home needs. Now that the springs of generosity have been tapped, private individuals in Sweden appear willing to sacrifice even the food and clothing they would normally feel they needed themselves. Being well disciplined, however, they murmur but little when their impulses are curbed by the guardian authorities which decline to give licences for their intended gifts to leave the country. In general, the authorities encourage Swedish citizens to help

their fellowmen abroad, not merely in Scandinavia, but, like a watchful nurse, take precautions lest these citizens by lack of foresight inflict undue privations on themselves. A sugar fund, for instance, was started in January for the benefit of Finland and Norway. Sugar is rationed in Sweden so every contribution was definitely self-denial on the part of the donor. Any citizen might take his sugar-cards to shop and forfeit coupons for any amount up to 2 kilogrammes, and the sugar-fund organization undertook all the trouble of packing and sending the sugar to its destination. Though 2 kilogrammes is a good deal for an individual to give, many would have sacrificed more, but this was not allowed in any single rationing period. However, there was no need for self-denial as the sugar was refused by the German-Norwegian authorities.

Swedish help to the victims of war outside Scandinavia has been on a smaller scale, though by no means negligible. A limited number of packages with secondhand clothing, and 200 parcels of food, was allowed to go to British prisoners of war at Christmas through the Swedish Y.M.C.A.; but in general the despatch of food and clothing is not allowed. Parcels were also sent to Poland until the end of 1940. Indeed, in the matter of private food parcels the Swedes mitigated their restrictions more for Poland than for any other country outside Scandinavia, but this channel of food and clothing relief is now closed. Swedish initiative has, however, devised what is called " paper vests " specially made of material which may be exported and paid for by public subscriptions. They are said to be a good practical protection against the winter cold, and the first batch of 100,000 were ready at the beginning of February for despatch by the Swedish Red Cross to France (occupied and unoccupied) and Belgium. On the initiative of the Crown Princess and Princess Sibylla the Y.M.C.A. had also collected 126,000 books (chiefly in English and French) by the beginning of December, examined them page by page to detect underlined passages and marginal notes, which are forbidden, and sent them to 378 prisoner-camps in various countries.

Every individual in Sweden feels the pinch of war, though this pinch is not enough to make anybody groan. Bread, sugar, butter, coffee, tea, pork and soap are strictly rationed, but the rations are so far ample. Curiously, the greatest hardship in the towns is the scarcity of fuel. Large quantities of coal, coke, and petrol were sent to Finland last winter, and despite agreements, Germany has not delivered the amounts

of coal expected, though this should have been relatively easy from the coal-mines of Poland, as Germany may still with some truth call the Baltic Sea *Mare Nostrum*, and should have ships enough to ply from Danzig and Gydnia to Stockholm. With the ample timber for which the normal outlet is closed, one might have expected the Swedes to adapt their heating to take home-supplies of wood. But this has not been done to any great extent and I am writing this in felt boots up to the knee, for the houses of Stockholm are cold this winter. Since the New Year indeed, private houses and hotels have been forbidden to supply hot water except in and from the kitchen. Certainly fewer baths have been taken in Stockholm this winter than in any other winter this century, for this may be done only at the public bathing establishments and foreign legations. Though the law appears water-tight, there is one large hotel in Stockholm which seems not to have been informed. The hot-water taps and baths still work there as usual, the only abnormality being an extra item on the bills. Petrol has disappeared from private consumption and internal combustion engines are driven in general by producer-gas.

The attitude of Swedes to the German war has been subject to fluctuation. It may safely be said that in this war sympathies in Sweden have all the time been strongly weighted on the side of the cause for which the Allies are fighting. Fluctuation has chiefly concerned their chances of success. It is remarkable that notwithstanding their proximity, the Swedes have been on the whole woefully ignorant of the negative feature of the Nazi régime, believing the real danger from the East, from Soviet Russia, to be the greater menace and mistakenly hoping even since the experience of the Soviet war on Finland that Germany, yes Nazi Germany, still affords them some protection against the Bolshevist peril. The Nazis in Norway have done much, however, to clarify men's minds in Sweden, and ever since Quisling was put in charge last September, the eyes of all have been opening. Practically the whole Swedish Press then spoke in no uncertain manner, denouncing the evil thing that was being done in Norway, and it has remained consistent in this respect ever since. Sensitive readers have complained from time to time of Swedish newspapers' partiality for news from Germany. Certainly the German view has had good play, but most of the great dailies have treated available news from the Allied countries with commendable fairness. Some influential newspapers in Göteborg, Stockholm, Upsala, Eskilstuna and elsewhere, could

always be relied on to give the Allied cause a fair deal. It would be idle to pretend there were no censorship or authoritative influence on the Swedish Press, but it would be just as wrong to call the Press muzzled. Many pro-British pamphlets, books, newspapers, and other matter, including particular issues of important Swedish dailies, have been confiscated. These sops to the Nazis are regrettable and apparently not balanced by the confiscations which have also taken place of pro-Nazi literature. Yet it must be admitted that on occasion newspapers speak out editorially with refreshing boldness in specifically Scandinavian matters, particularly concerning the treatment of the Royal House in Norway, the regimentation of the law-courts, the brutalities of the Hirdmen as disclosed by Norway's seven bishops, and above all in regard to German suggestions that Sweden must prepare to take her place in the " New Order " of Europe.

On this last point Swedish statesmen have also publicly shown themselves distinctly negative. Hr. Vougt, Parliamentary Leader of the Social Democrats, stated in the Lower House, for instance, that it would be incompatible with the Swedish conception of neutrality to discuss the question now. At Halmstad on January 19, Hr. Günther, the Foreign Minister, also urged Swedes not to speculate too deeply on Sweden's place in the future New Europe, but to strengthen their country to the utmost, economically, morally, physically, and militarily. Nothing was more dangerous for a small country, he said, than to become a " military vacuum " in the vicinity of great powers at war, not merely because " great powers like other beasts of prey " are always inclined to fall upon the weakest in sheer lust for conquest, but because each great power regards small countries unable to defend themselves as a danger, tempting the other side to occupy them for strategic purposes. Numerous other authoritative pronouncements have been made on the subject, and since the second stage of Quislingism began in Norway, there has certainly been a stiffening of Sweden's will to resist active attempts from without to convert the adaptability of her cherished neutrality into submission to a theoretical and unborn 'new order " of regimentation with which the Swedish nation is not in sympathy. Sweden's power of resistance is approaching a maximum, having been restored and developed since the supplies of material to Finland had weakened her own defences. The monthly expenditure on defence now amounts to more than the defence budget for a whole year which some four years ago nearly brought about

the Government's defeat. In his May-day speech, Hr. Bagge, Leader of the Conservative Party, emphasized the purely defensive nature of Sweden's armed forces, calling Sweden in arms an *Igelkott* (Hedgehog)—a winged term which became popular throughout the country and is certainly more apt to-day than when it was coined.

The general view in Stockholm is that the chances of remaining out of the war have not diminished. There have been moments of anxiety, apart from those contingent on the fighting and occupation of Norway, but these have sprung from real or fancied tendencies in the Soviet Union. The most serious was about August 10, when symptoms were interpreted as indicating Soviet intentions to repeat the attack on Finland, but the incipient storm subsided. The attitude of Germany appeared ambiguous, when the German positions at the extreme north of Norway were being strengthened with men, concrete, and guns to an extent which could scarcely be necessary at this spot against Great Britain. Germany also required, obtained, and utilized the right of transit through Finland to North Norway for men, munitions and other supplies, and at one time it was credibly reported that German soldiers on Finnish soil between the Gulf of Bothnia and Petsamo numbered a few thousand. As winter advanced, this transit traffic diminished, and the number of German troops in Finland became negligible.

If Sweden remains intact until the end of the war, she may be expected to seize with alacrity the chance of helping her distressed Nordic neighbours to reconstruct the needs of sane existence. It is argued that the chance would be a meagre one if the Government had shortsightedly yielded to impulse, plunged into war *without the power to give effective aid*, and brought ruin down on Sweden too. However this may be, the belief is strong that the policy of Swedish " neutrality " stands or falls not merely by the material welfare it has secured for the Swedish people but by the less selfish service it will ultimately enable Sweden to render to Scandinavia as a whole and thereby to Nordic solidarity when the war comes to an end.

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SOCIAL SCIENCE

By Sir P. Chalmers Mitchell

A COLLECTION of Essays* composed at different dates for different readers presents a difficulty to the reviewer unless the author be merely a pleasant composer of ideas and words, or has a limited and specialized theme to present in its various aspects, technical and popular. But Dr. Huxley has a wide-ranging mind. He is not only a distinguished field naturalist, a patient researcher in genetics, a traveller who has kept his eyes open in many parts of the world, but a shrewd student of our changing civilization. All the essays are easy to read, and their matter, with an alluring blend of exposition, persuasion and provocation, makes them so well worth reading that the question of their relevance to a general theme need not arise even with subjects apparently unconnected, as for example, the size and the courtship of animals, the intelligence of birds or the extinction of the Dodo. The volume, however, has a real cohesion, due to what may be called a psychological state, partly emotional, partly intellectual. It is the state of an acute and anxious observer of a drifting world, passionately hoping that mankind may be led to a richer and better life by social science, by a humanism directed by knowledge.

The first essay, *The Uniqueness of Man*, from which the title of the collection is taken, explains Dr. Huxley's biological approach to social science. In a sense every species, or at least every genus, is unique. But Man has properties which have made him lord of the animate world, a possible master of his own fate, by giving him comprehension of, and power over his surroundings. Primitive man, Dr. Huxley writes, accepted an obvious kinship with the animals and seemed to take little pride in his own humanity. But as civilization, Man's own creation, advanced, animal divinities and various physiological functions, such as sex, gradually lost the sacred importance which he himself had conferred on them. The Gods came anthropomorphic and human psychological qualities pre-eminent. Man saw

**The Uniqueness of Man*, by Julian Huxley. Chatto and Windus, 1941, 10s. 6d.

himself as a being set apart, with the rest of the animal kingdom created to serve his needs and his pleasures. In western civilization this swing of the pendulum reached its limit in Christian theology and the philosophy of Descartes.

With Darwin the swing of the pendulum was reversed. Human kinship with the animals was placed on a scientific basis and the inference was accepted that Man was an animal like the others, the dominant type for the present phase of evolution, by chance rather than because of his unique qualities. The first of the latter and the most obviously unique was the power of speech, not merely 'sweet articulate speech, words sweetly divided apart,' but speech expressing objects, not only emotional states. The most important consequence was the development of a cumulative tradition external to the living individual. No doubt in a sense there is something like a tradition when animals teach their offspring what they have learned in the unfolding of their own instincts. But that is resident in the living individual and does not accumulate through the generations. The external and cumulative body of knowledge surviving through the conceptual ideas crystallized in words has made possible the improvement of tools and machinery in conjunction with the bi-focal vision and co-ordination between sight and hands acquired by his arboreal ancestors.

Dr. Huxley ranges over a wide number of the qualities of Man, physical and psychological, wherever possible tracing them to their biological basis and showing their effect in the factors which make it possible for him to develop his own social science. For example, he is the most variable of wild species, and yet, alone amongst dominant types, has not split into a multitude of mutually infertile species, genera, and so forth. He has been able to range through the world retaining interspecific fertility. According to the laws established by Mendelian experiments, the crossing between human varieties produced by isolation and united by migration has generated excess variability. Yet another significant unique quality is the duration of childhood and youth affording a time when the parental care frees the young from struggle for the necessities of life so that they can devote their overflowing energy to the blunting of mere instincts, to experimental exploration of their senses and faculties, and to acquiring some of the accumulated knowledge of the past. Summing up he says:

> Man represents the culmination of that process of organic evolution which has been proceeding on this planet for over a thousand million

years. That process, however wasteful and cruel it may be, and into however many blind alleys it may have been diverted, is also in one respect progressive. Man has now become the sole representative of life in that progressive aspect and its sole trustee for any progress in the future.

Thus, by a fortunate process of evolution, Man has acquired the physical and psychological characters which make it possible for him to become self-conscious of his past and his future, to discard projections of himself such as magic and religion, and to take advantage of the science which he has created to guide his own progress.

Before passing to consideration of a general, partly philosophical, problem which this attitude presents, I wish to pay tribute to Dr. Huxley's enlightening discussion of these problems of race which play a vital part in the political questions of to-day and tomorrow (if the Peace settlement optimistically can be dated 'tomorrow'). The concept of Race is discussed in a separate chapter, and the kindred question implied in the popular phrase 'Nature and Nurture' is raised there and, incidentally, in other essays. The concept of Race mingles factors depending on inherited constitution and others depending on the reaction between the 'constitution' and the environment. After a simple description of the hereditary constitution of any organism as a large number of the discrete units known as genes which can normally perpetuate themselves by self-reproduction, he explains that when the sets of genes are mixed in a cross, there may be blending of visible characters, but not blending or modification of the genes themselves. The genes alter only in a very rare process of mutation. Constitutional variation arises when two different stocks are crossed, but also, although to a lesser extent, in the reassembling of genes which takes place even when the parents are closely akin, as in the case of the differences amongst the children of a single pair of parents each of which is produced by the fertilization of a single female cell by a single male cell. This may be contrasted with the extreme case of 'identical twins,' alike in sex and in physical and mental constitution, because they have arisen by the division of a single fertilized egg into two cells, each of which instead of producing a half of the same child, completes itself to produce a whole child.

But the growth of a fertilized egg into the adult is a reaction between its inherited constitution, its stock of genes, and its environment. Here, in a wide sense is the difference between

'nature' and 'nurture,' the former being the inherited constitution, the latter the response to the environment. Some characters, such as stature, the proportion of the width to the length of the head, the colour of the eyes, are hardly affected by the environment; no difference in nutrition, for example, could make an Esquimaux as tall as a typical Lowland Scot. These characters have been studied closely by geneticists and their behaviour in cross-fertilization is well understood. But there is the difficulty that hardly any human 'race,' even the Jews, are pure, and the genes of their constitutions may show almost any combination of characters. All that can be recognized is a difference in the statistical frequency of such a racial character as long head or round head.

On the other hand psychological characters respond much more quickly and more extensively to the environment. Geneticists have not yet advanced much beyond a conviction that such characters also depend initially on the inherited stock of genes and that at least there is no necessary association between the natural inheritance of genes for physical and for mental and emotional characters. The environment is the dominant factor. In the case of the Germans, for instance, Dr. Huxley writes:

> In Carlyle's time, the German national character was supposed to be peaceable, philosophic, musical and individualist. After the Franco-Prussian War it became arrogant and militarist. Now we are witnessing the blossoming of tendencies to state-worship, mass-enthusiasm and the like which we are once more assured are inherent in it. But it would be inconceivable on any biological theory whatsoever, let alone on that of modern genetics, to believe that the inherent constitution of the German people could change so rapidly. We are, therefore, driven to believe that the change where it has not been merely an apparent one, due to the bias of the recorder, has been brought about by changes in social atmosphere and institutions.

It would be an advantage for the future of the world if all those now engaged in propaganda, and still more if all those who will have any part in trying to arrange a Peace Settlement, were to study Dr. Huxley's essay on the Concept of Race and perchance to agree with his conclusion that the 'question-begging term Race' should be banished from all discussions of human affairs.

But the phrase 'due to the bias of the recorder' in the quotation I have just given raises a special issue. Dr. Huxley wishes our future to be guided by science. The word 'science' is acquiring the spell-binding power which 'religion' has not yet completely lost. Archbishops and *The Times* are telling us

that the way out of our troubles is the restoration of Christian religious training in our schools, primary and secondary, with teachers not only of doctrinal knowledge but of certified faith. We are to be saved by prayer and piety. Dr. Huxley, as I infer from his essay on Religion as an Objective Problem, believes in neither. "The advance of natural knowledge, logic and psychology," he writes, "has brought us to a stage at which God is no longer a useful hypothesis." Religion and the conception of God have gone through a process of evolution, each stage justified by its response to human needs. Theologians, I suppose, would say that such a pragmatic sanction, even if there be some historical basis for it, is irrelevant, the diagnostic of religion being its origin from a specific and dated supernatural interpolation. It is from such a belief that religion and its votaries derive the prestige, almost magical in kind, which lets them 'get away' with their habitual acceptance of current political opinion and their notorious deficiency in practical wisdom.

Now it is not certain that the scientific authority, partly emotional, partly intellectual, which Dr. Huxley would like to increase, rests on a securer basis than the magic of religion. True, there is a flavour of magic in our emotions when we are told of discoveries in the expanses of stellar space or in those infinitesimal recesses where matter and energy seem to coalesce, and of the miraculous when we learn that inferences from an abstract mathematical thesis have predicted correctly what can be seen only when the light from a star passes by the disk of the sun in a total eclipse. But at most only a very small proportion of the people are subject to such affections. More of us are grateful for the practical fruits of science, which at least are more conspicuous than those of religion, for the chemistry which has given us new products, for engineering and wireless, for genetics which has given new sources of food and may be leading the way to improvement of the human species itself.

But it is true that scientific men, apart from their specialisms, are not more conspicuous than the clergy for notable divergence from vulgar opinion, or for practical wisdom. Indeed I should guess that among the Fellows of the Royal Society there was at least as high a percentage of docile followers of the Conservative Political Party, as amongst the landed gentry or successful business men. Many of them have shewn an extraordinary ability to keep their power of sifting and arranging facts in a water-tight compartment. Faraday, one of the

greatest of experimental physicists, was a rigid devotee of a very narrow form of protestantism: Gosse, the great naturalist of the sea-shore, believed in the Bible story of creation, and in his ingenious book *Omphale* was able to explain the presence of fossils in the rocks, signs of age-long denudation, plants in seed, flower and fruit, birds and their eggs and nestlings, Adam and Eve with navels, in a world created in six days a few thousand years ago. In more recent times, Crookes and Lodge, experimentalists of a very high order, were able to believe in communication with the dead, on evidence which would not have baffled an amateur conjurer.

The Oxford dictionary states that 'science,' in the sense of knowledge, is an archaic usage. It now means "systematic and formulated knowledge, moral, political, natural, etc., and pursuit of this, or the principles regulating such pursuit." And here I come on a distinction which certainly is implicit in much that Dr. Huxley writes but which, none the less he seems sometimes to overlook. A discovery in natural knowledge is not accepted as genuine on authority, however great, or however it may have been proved trustworthy. The exact methods by which it has been reached must be clearly stated, and be of such a kind that it can be repeated by others. Only when other workers, using the same methods under similar conditions, get the same result, does it pass from being accepted as probability resting on the authority and reputation of the original discoverer to becoming a stone in the fabric of knowledge. There is nothing subjective about it, nothing dependent on the opinions or bias of an individual. Sometimes it happens that other competent persons fail to produce identical results, and their work may show that the conditions of the original discovery had not been completely known, that there were independent variables, or in the technical phrase, that the experiments and observations had not been made on an 'isolate,' and further clearing has to be done, before 'proof' can be accepted.

Now this method has been the peculiar weapon of science, and its pursuit through several centuries has led to a vast extension of knowledge, has put on a more secure basis the fundamental hypothesis of the uniformity of nature, and has given us a greater confidence in the possibility of human faculties being able to deal with something that may be called external reality, not a mere anthropomorphic projection. And also it has vested in the term science a dignity and an authority surpassing magic and religion. But, unfortunately, it cannot

be applied to very large branches of knowledge. It is supreme in mathematics, has a very wide application in the physical sciences and one more limited in biology. The trouble is that different methods have to be employed in dealing with a vast number of subjects amongst which are the past history, the present and the future of humanity. These methods almost exclude the possibility of reaching 'proof' of the premiss from which you seek to make competent inferences. Let me take an easy example. Mill's famous *Joint Method of Agreement and Difference* really implies the possibility of arranging isolates. Take control experiments in physiology. You wish to study the effect, say on white mice, of a particular drug or inoculation. You select two dozen mice, so far as you can judge, of the same stock, weight, age, sex and so forth. You put one dozen in one vivarium, the other in another of exactly the same kind. You give them the same food, temperature, etc., but to one set you give the drug or the inoculation, and omit it with the others. The object is to isolate the effect of the drug or inoculation so that you may compare it with the untreated 'controls.' But even a white mouse is a complex unit and the whole experiment involves, amongst other variables, the judgment of the experimenter on his choice of individuals. At most he can get only a statistical result. Take a more difficult case, but one more nearly approaching the problems of applying 'science' to human affairs. Goldwin Smith, a witty sceptic of the nineteenth century, proposed to test the efficacy of prayer by the Joint Method. Two surgical wards, as nearly identical as possible, were to be filled with equal numbers of patients, again chosen as nearly as possible in the same stages and degrees of seriousness of the same complaint, but to one set of patients was to be added the supposed benefit of prayer, denied the other. Of course the proposal was a jest, but it shows the flaws in efforts to give 'scientific' validity to many of the familiar analogies used with respect to human affairs. An extreme case is the so-called science of history, and the theory that lessons for the present can be drawn from our imperfect knowledge of the past. Every revolution has its own precedent and contemporary conditions, both of which we know only superficially. If one considers only an event so recent and so well documented as the Paris Commune of 1871 and compares the different descriptions and interpretations made by different writers, one sees how impossible it is to attach anything like scientific merit to its study. Even inferences drawn from contemporary

events, such for example as the Nazi attempt to mould German youth into a new form, cannot be employed as an example of how a different kind of training of the different people of Great Britain would mould them into the desired form. The closer you approach to precisely those problems of humanity in which Dr. Huxley takes a passionate interest, the further you have moved from the possibility of the isolates and control experiments which have conferred on science its aura of infallibility.

A new and subjective element comes into the handling of facts and factors where there are no equivalent units, an element absent from the method which admits of ' proof.' The new element is individual judgment, and in its extremer form the assignment of ' values.' Now I do not doubt but that values have to be assigned and that a great part of progress has come and must come from a right choice of them. But there is nothing objective in them. They vary from individual to individual, from age to age, and are subject to all sorts of social conditions, states of culture, slow or sudden shifts in the circumambient flux of events. There is always a time-lag in their changes, even when a factor like a political revolution, a swift economic change, or the propagation of a far-reaching theory such as the doctrine of evolution, impinges on the general consciousness. There has to be, in Nietsche's phrase, a revaluation of all values. We ourselves have to judge of the values of those who make the new valuations. And in doing so we act according to our own sense of values, our own bias. My point is that wherever the assignment of values is necessary, scientific men have no greater claim to authority than historians, poets or philosophers.

I do not suggest that Dr. Huxley is ignorant of the distinction between objective certainty and subjective authority. Indeed it is implicit in many of his essays, but when he is dealing more directly with the wide problems of humanity (and his dealing is always worthy of close attention) he introduces explicitly the need of valuation of factors, and does not seem to realize or at least to be explicit in appreciation of the fundamental difference between the methods of natural and social science. He selects Karl Marx as the " true John the Baptist of social science." He regards Herbert Spencer, " for all his academic knowledge," as being essentially analogical in his work. But Marx " developed a system based on social facts and directly applicable to them," and it is stretching a good many points to assess Marx as less analogical than Spencer. Like Engels, but less than Engels, he included

science in his vast knowledge and wide reading, but was a man of the library and not of the laboratory. Even 'dialectical materialism' was based on a great series of analogies, completely a matter of subjective valuation. I am not undervaluing Marx; like Dr. Huxley I believe him to be high among the dozen or so of human beings whose assignment of values has given a permanent set to world thought. I find myself that his principle of the relation between economic practice and political theory and the conditions of the environment one of the most illuminating doctrines that has ever been taught. All human affairs are in constant flux, and there is no certain inference from the past to the future. The methods of social science are different in kind from those of natural science and their applications lead to no certainty or even consistency. Lenin, and following him Stalin, unlike many of their early associates, understood this, and had to treat as rebels some of those who thought that Marx had laid down eternal principles. Lenin and Stalin, more Marxian than many Marxists, realized that in the changed conditions produced by the revolution itself, socialism had differentiated itself from communism (Marx and Engels used the two almost as interchangeable) and that before the revolution could spread its liberating doctrine to the rest of the world, it had first to transform Russia into a prosperous socialist state. In the process, moreover, many concessions had to be made to the lag in the conversion of bourgeois opinion.

It is a distressing circumstance, moreover, that any argument or thesis in which values are involved, whether assigned by men who have won their spurs in the exacter forms of science, or in philosophy, metaphysics, or religion may excite angry passions in those who employ different standards. The days may seem to have passed by when a Giordano Bruno can be burned at the stake. But Dr. Huxley himself appears to suggest that geneticists, or at least genetics encounter a risk of 'liquidation' in the U.S.S.R., and certainly communism, a theory of social science, is regarded as a crime in many modern countries. Perhaps, even, to throw doubt on the value of a Day of Prayer to our War Effort may be dangerous.

(Sir Peter Chalmers Mitchell was succeeded as Secretary of the Zoological Society by Dr. Huxley.)

SCOUTING—A CODE OF LIVING

By Lord Somers

YOU cannot evade Youth in these days. It smiles at you from the photographic pages of the newspapers and magazines; the printed columns tell of its splendid achievements and, alas often enough, its misdemeanours. Cabinet Ministers, Industrialists, Ministers of Religion, Social Workers, Schoolmasters, are all contributing their thoughts and ideas to the problems of Youth and the future of Youth. Youth certainly is in the news.

It takes a war to rouse the nation to an interest in its young people. Youth can save the nation from defeat. Youth can rebuild the world after victory. That much is evident from what is happening at the present time, and all classes of Youth are playing their part.

It was that wise visionary, the late Lord Baden-Powell, who roused the world to a sensible realization that the boy of to-day is the man of to-morrow. It is of little use to build a new University, a new Hospital, or a new and beautiful Cathedral, if you pay no attention to the young people who will eventually move in and take control of those very institutions. It is foolish to formulate war aims and make plans for a new world if you disregard the people upon whose shoulders will fall the responsibility of carrying them out.

Any man or woman who has the welfare of young people at heart will therefore welcome this growing interest in Youth. But let us be guarded against those who would organize Youth on a foundation of shifting sand. We cannot afford to waste time on temporary bridges. No good will come of hysteric activity because we have a war on our hands. There must be no foundations of sand and no temporary bridges. The first fundamental in the foundation must be a Christian ideal, a simple faith of duty to God and all that it implies—service to one's fellow man, goodwill to all.

You do not give an award of merit for living as God intended you should live. The reward surely lies in the warm feeling that comes after service—the sense that you have done the right and noble thing, and in finding more work to do. In the

Scouts we give badges for proficiency in swimming, signalling, pathfinding, athletics, and some sixty odd other subjects—but no merit badge for a good turn which is the daily duty of every Scout.

When Lord Baden-Powell founded Scouting he realized that he would never succeed in making a world Movement with a programme of mere physical fitness, camping, backwoodsmanship, scoutcraft and similar activities. It required something more and the germ of that something more was the daily good turn, which developed naturally from the Scout Promise which every boy makes when he becomes a Scout.

Curiously enough it was the performance of a good turn by a London Scout which led to the formation of the American Boy Scouts Association, now over 1,000,000 strong. It was the outcome of a single act of kindness and the refusal of a reward for the service rendered.

In a recent message President Roosevelt said:

> I am proud of the achievements of our Boy Scouts. The Movement's record of service in distress and disaster and every type of emergency, as well as its achievements for character-building and citizenship training, commands universal respect.

That is a splendid tribute to Scouting. The President of the United States says that the Movement commands universal respect. It may be said with truth that Scouting has earned the respect of the world. In forty-eight countries there are Boy Scouts. Included in this total are those countries which are at present under Hitler's heel. Active Scouting may have ceased in many of these countries, but the spirit of Scouting lives on in the hearts of individual Scouts and when the day of liberation comes, as come it will, this same spirit will find expression in active work for the betterment of the world through the fellowship of mankind.

In 1914, just when the Scout Movement was growing abroad, the Great War broke on the world. In September of that year Lord Baden-Powell wrote:

> The point to be considered is whether these storms are due to the laws of Nature, to the hand of God, or the machinations of men. If the latter, could not some more effective method be devised than this clogging preparation which in the end not only fails in its objective of preventing war but brings it about on a bigger scale when it eventually comes?
>
> But the lessons of the war, when grasped, should not then be thrown away and forgotten; they should give urgent reason for a more effective education in the brotherhood of man such as shall prevent the recurrence in future generations of the horror now falling upon us and upon millions of innocent fellow sufferers of all nations.

I believe that with the dawn of peace after this terrible storm-cloud has rolled away our Scout brotherhood may take a big part in the scheme of uniting the nations in a closer and better bond of mutual understanding and sympathy such as will tend to fulfil that hope.

With the war over the expansion of Scouting was steady. In 1920 the first International Jamboree, attended by 26 nations, was held. Baden-Powell's message to the Scouts on that occasion crystallizes the objective of Scouting in the world:

Brother Scouts, I ask you to make a solemn choice. Differences exist between the peoples of the world in thought and sentiment, just as they do in language and physique. The War has taught us that if one nation tries to impose its particular will upon others cruel reaction is bound to follow. The Jamboree has taught us that if we exercise mutual forbearance and give and take, then there is sympathy and harmony. If it be your will, let us go forth from here fully determined that we will develop among ourselves and our boys that comradeship, through the world-wide spirit of the Scout Brotherhood, so that we may help to develop peace and happiness in the world and goodwill among men. Brother Scouts answer me. Will you join in this endeavour?

Then, on August 4, 1929, during the third World Jamboree, the Archbishop of Canterbury spoke of

the great army of the youth of all nations, pledged to the spirit of Peace and Goodwill among men.

Here is a power without which the Treaties and Leagues are of little avail. It is the power of the spirit. It passes into you and lays hold of you through the instinct of comradeship with one another. You are learning it when you see boys of many nations and many languages wearing the same Scout uniform and obeying the same Scout Laws, and when around the Camp fire you meet together. In future days, when you have become citizens of your various countries you will remember and know that in spite of any differences which may arise you are all brothers.

Such splendid success was being achieved, and then a dark shadow appeared on the horizon in the form of Totalitarian States. Nothing which breathed the air of world fellowship could live in such a State. So in Germany, Italy and Russia, Scouting ceased to exist and in its place arose national Movements inspired and controlled by the State, based on an ideology of State, and bereft of any spiritual foundation.

Such Movements, founded on shifting sands cannot hope to survive. In a world brought closer by ever quickening means of transport and by radio, there must be sympathetic understanding and tolerance, and co-operation between the nations, and this can only be achieved through an ideal acceptable to all, an ideal such as is set up in the Scout Promise.

As Chief Scout it will be my steadfast aim to perfect British scouting so that it may be an example and an encouragement to the rest of the world.

In the past many Scout Leaders have come to this country to take part in our training courses and it has been our endeavour on these occasions to foster the spirit of friendship and co-operation. Results have shown us that we have more than succeeded in our purpose and that with the end of hostilities our training centres will be in full swing again and we shall be welcoming more and more Scoutmasters from abroad to Gilwell Park, our principal centre. Gilwell Park is a place which will for ever be associated with Lord Baden-Powell, for he chose the name of Gilwell for his title.

The Founder of Scouting for Boys earned a place for himself in the world, by capturing the youth of his time. The boys called him Chief Scout of the world—surely the most honoured of his many titles—and the very character of his life work demands that we who follow must carry it on. We shall fail him and, indeed, all the thousands who have known the joys of good fellowship through Scouting, if we did not build on the foundations which "B-P" has laid down for us.

Scouting is more than a Movement, it is a code of living, open to every boy or man of whatever class, colour or creed, a code based on the ideal of Service before Self, of love towards one another and on the faith that "We are of one blood in the sight of God."

(Lord Somers succeeded the late Lord Baden-Powell as Chief Scout.)

HEALTH AND THE DOCTOR

By Harry Roberts

WHAT do we mean by health? People commonly talk of the medical services and of the health services as though they were pretty much the same thing. In fact, they are nothing of the kind. The farmers and the bakers and the mothers and the political economists, to say nothing of those engaged in sanitary research in laboratories and curiously inclined observers everywhere, have contributed, and still contribute, to the art and science of healthy living; and are as much concerned with health as are those whom we have specially trained to correct divagations from health. Health is but another word for wholeness of life, and he is the healthiest man who can most effectively and happily establish a relation of harmony between himself and his environment. Health would seem to be almost coincident with desirable human life. In its service, saint and philosopher and artist are ministers no less important than are the oculist, dentist and physician. In fact, nearly every active person in the community plays some part, large or small, efficiently or inefficiently, in the service of national health. The medical services and the health services are not the same thing, overlap as they obviously do.

As this short article cannot hope to deal with the complete re-organization of human society, I propose to talk only about the re-arrangement and co-ordination of the strictly medical services—that is, of those services manned, or at any rate, officered, by doctors. But doctors, though for the greater part trained in common, are not all engaged in the same sort of work, or confronted with the same tasks. There is little immediate similarity between the work and duties of the medical officer of health, those of the hospital surgeon and those of the family doctors, which last constitute more than three-quarters of the doctors whose names are on the Medical Register.

It is generally agreed that most of these men and women are reasonably competent; that, in their several ways, they

render valuable service, and that they display at least as much public spirit and unselfishness as do their neighbours. Yet, there is a widespread feeling, which the doctors themselves share, that a great part of their knowledge, their skill, their experience and their time is being wasted through mere lack of organization. The successful political planner, like any good business man, gets clear in his mind, first, what it is he is aiming at; and in the second place, what is the material, human and other, at his disposal. An accurate assessment of the psychologic impulses of the human material involved is essential. It is idle to plan on the assumption that the world is made up of altruistic saints, waiting but for the opportunity to manifest a selflessness stifled only by contemporary circumstance. Let us look into our own hearts; there we shall find the lowest common denominator and the highest common factor of average human motivation.

This, then, in the matter of our medical services, is our problem: How best and most effectively can we make available to every man, woman and child in this country, in proportion to their several needs, all existent medical knowledge, technical skill and hygienic amenities, regardless of individual ability to pay for them. Towards this ideal we have muddled a long way. The poorest person in our great cities shares with the richest the same water supply and the same drainage system. The services of the physicians and surgeons who minister to a king are available, without payment, to the humblest out-of-work admitted to any one of our large city hospitals. The surgeon who operated on King George V had for years performed the same operation on numerous men, women and children in East London who would have found it difficult to pay a five-shilling fee. So far, so good; and there is more to add. Every man and woman wage-earner is to-day entitled to demand the services of a medical practitioner of his or her choice at any hour of the day or night; and it is probable that at least nine-tenths of these panel patients receive as good medical "treatment" as do the paying patients of general practitioners anywhere.

In the course of the last fifty years, stupendous advances have been made in our knowledge of the workings of the human body and mind. We have learned far more than we ever knew before about the factors contributory to health and about those contributory to disease. This kind of knowledge is what we mean by medical science; and the application of that knowledge to human welfare is what we mean by medical art. We

have in this country many thousands of men and women who have devoted anything from five to ten years in acquiring this knowledge and mastering this art.

For over forty years I have been engaged in active general practice; and, consequently, have had unusual opportunity of observing the changes that have occurred in the relations between doctor and patient, and between the doctor and the State, in the course of the past four decades.

When I started in practice, specialism, on the scale of its present-day existence, was unknown. When an individual talked about seeing the doctor, or getting medical advice, or being under medical treatment, he meant—and it was understood—that he was in consultation with his family doctor. There were, of course, men who specialized in surgery, and others in pathology; a few men had a reputation for knowing a lot about skin troubles, and a few others about disorders of the throat and ear. You could almost count the professed gynæcologists on the fingers of your hand. The G.P. covered nearly all the ground; and, for ninety-nine people out of a hundred, provided all the medical and surgical treatment they received between birth and death.

In the then state of knowledge, I doubt if the public lost much by this arrangement. Take my own case, situated as I was in my first practice in the Land's End district of Cornwall. The nearest hospital worth talking about, and the nearest specialist worth talking about were in Plymouth, over sixty miles away. There were no motor ambulances in existence, and no ambulances of any kind available. I was often confronted with the dilemma of performing a fairly major operation that I had never performed before, or leaving my patient to certain death. Sometimes I was lucky, sometimes not so lucky. Removing a tumour, with the patient lying on the ground outside a gipsy tent, and throwing the swabs into the camp fire, has elements of excitement of its own. The amputation of a breast in a cottage bedroom is not quite the same thing as giving a note of recommendation to the nearest hospital.

The more knowledge grows in width and depth, the more subtle and elaborate becomes the technique of its practical application. Thus we get Adam Smith's "Division of Labour" over again in a new form; the technical field becomes too great for any one man to cover it; and so we have—and need—surgeons and physicians, oculists, laryngologists and gynæcologists, medical officers of health and family doctors;

while other trained men and women will devote themselves and their time to medical research, and thus contribute to the growth of medical science. Hospitals and other institutions have grown up in response to obvious needs. In the last decade or two there has been—especially in London and a few other large towns—a very great development in hospital provision of a high order of efficiency. (This, unfortunately, does not hold good of the country at large). In many of our cities, indeed, there exists a collection of treatment services, public and private, approximating to adequacy. Further improvement is, of course, desirable and possible; but the real trouble is of another kind.

Between all these services there is little real co-ordination. There is in existence nothing which could be truly described as a corporate National Health Service. The medical provision under the Health Insurance Act, with all its defects, has shown itself to be a good workable basis for such a national system; but it should be *expanded* so as to provide access for everyone to the available services needed in each particular case. It should be *extended* so as to include within its scope not only the wives and children of insured persons, but all the members of families of corresponding or lower economic status. Personally, I would like it extended to cover the whole population, rich and poor alike; because it is only when our children go to the same schools, and all our families have the same medical services at their disposal, that the more influential members of society will begin to take a real interest in communal life and activities. Whether the doctors are paid by salaries or on a capitation basis or by a combination of the two methods is of secondary importance. The great thing is to get the services provided, organized and made available to all. The medical curriculum is probably the longest and most elaborate professional training in the world. It demands from students, as a minimum condition of licence to practice, more time and a greater measure of concentration and application than are demanded from students of law, of theology, or of any of the applied sciences.

As one result of his education, the average doctor in this country, whatever his faults and limitations, is an excellent diagnostician—that is to say, so far as the physical diseases to which names have been given are concerned, he can nearly always recognize them. And this is a very valuable thing.

The basic importance of the general practitioner, the family doctor, in any national system of health services should be as

obvious to everyone in Whitehall and to every intelligent member of the public, as it is to the leaders of the medical profession. No matter how specialism may grow, no matter how extensively the hospital and clinic systems may develop, it is clear that there must be some method of selecting suitable cases (and of eliminating the unsuitable) for treatment at these institutions. It would be foolish for everyone with a headache or a little temporary digestive upset to rush off to a hospital, diverting energy and time from the therapeutic and special work which should be its main concern. I believe that the mastery of the art of diagnosis—with all that that implies—is the biggest contribution which the general practitioner can make to social well-being. Indignation has been expressed at this conception of the doctor's most important function. It has been suggested that it reduces him to the position of a shop-walker who merely directs customers to the appropriate department. Analogies are notoriously dramatic rather than precise; but, in any event, a truer parallel is furnished by the police-court magistrate, whose work is not generally regarded as petty or contemptible.

But diagnosis, even for the general practitioner, is not enough. He is, or should be, competent to apply all relevant existing knowledge to the treatment of ninety-nine per cent. of the patients who consult him. In dealing with these, any sensible practitioner is as competent and as potent as the most be-baroneted royal physician or surgeon.

In addition to these two functions, there is one other—possibly the most important of all—which hitherto, although it would seem to be within his obvious province, the general practitioner or family doctor has fulfilled but indifferently. Preventive medicine is verbally all the rage. Great surgeons and small journalists join with great journalists and humble practitioners in paying homage to the ideal of prevention; and most of them are prepared to divulge at least one secret, one hygienic axiom, whereby disease may be kept at bay and youthfulness prolonged. Though these exhortations and exordiums are not always convincing, the general sentiment which is used to justify them is sound, and is shared by an increasing number of people. Newspaper articles offering advice on healthy living are admittedly popular features, though the public is not always as yet able to distinguish between plausible flap-doodle and reliable doctrine. "The subject being so variable hath made the art by consequence more conjectural, and the art being conjectural hath made so

much the more place to be left for imposture." Yet, in the whole course of medical training, the principles of healthy living are hardly referred to. If the general practitioner of to-day has any knowledge of personal hygiene, or any ideas on the personal care of health, it is safe to say that he did not gather these things within the walls of his medical school.

It is towards the raising of the general level of health—psychic as well as physical—rather than towards the securing of some slight extension of the length of life of an individual here and there that medical and hygienic enthusiasm should be, at least in part, diverted.

The outstanding hygienic victories of the past hundred years or so are in the realm of preventive medicine. Public sanitary reforms can claim most of the praise for the very great fall in the national death-rate, and especially for the disappearance or diminution of the great epidemic scourges, such as plague, typhus, infantile gastro-enteritis, and typhoid. The improvement in the standard of living of the poor, and the wider availability of good and suitable food have done more to lower the incidence and the fatality of tuberculosis than has any specific treatment purely medical in nature.

A little while ago, it looked as though the possibilities of preventive medicine were nearing their limits. Further knowledge and experience have shown that this is far from the fact, even in the matter of collective hygiene. So long as the wide disparity that still exists between the death-rates of the poor and the rich, and between the death-rates of the industrial towns and the agricultural districts obtains, there is obviously plenty of scope for our social and economic reformers; and it is up to the general practitioners, who alone have the right of entering, on confidential, friendly terms, into the homes of the people, constantly to force the facts on the public attention. It is not irrelevant and, in a cynical way, not unamusing, to quote certain words of Mr. Lloyd George in 1911, when he was telling his public about the glorious results that would follow the passing of the National Insurance Act. He said:

> The Insurance Committees will have to make reports to the municipalities and the Government on the health of their districts as it affects the administration of the Act. These reports will be most valuable. For the first time you will have reports on the health of fifteen millions of working-class households in this country. Think of what that means! There is no end to what you may be able to do in the way of social reform upon these searching, penetrating and all-pervading reports on the causes of disease in the homes of the people. I am not for a moment minimizing the admirable work that is done

> by the medical officers of health. But a medical officer of health cannot visit every house in his district. Here, on the other hand, you will have tens of thousands of medical men who will be serving these local health committees, visiting in the course of a year every home, and sending faithful reports to the health committee, upon which the majority will be representatives of the working-classes. Therefore, the doctors will not have to consider in their reports the feelings and idiosyncrasies of men on the committee who possess local interest. They will be reporting to men whose main interest is the health of their own families. For the first time in the history of this country you have got that portentous fact to reckon with in social reform.

It is not to our credit as doctors that we have let this promise slide so easily into oblivion.

But another fact has emerged. Preventive medicine, we now see, is of individual no less than of collective application. The value of our new scientific knowledge is more than half wasted if it is not made understandable of the people. Moreover, even for its effective social application, the collaboration of the individual is found to be necessary; and this collaboration can be secured only if informed persons in direct contact with ordinary men and women—persons in whom these individuals have confidence as friends and advisers—act as missioners of health. I believe that it is as a hygienic missionary, a medical officer of health to the individual, that the ordinary practising doctor of the present and, even more, of the future, can render the greatest service to the community. There is no one else in so favourable a position for doing this work.

There is a popular idea that between treatment and prevention there is a fundamental distinction. This is but a half-truth. Every time we successfully treat a wound of the hand we prevent the serious consequences that often, and the lethal consequences that occasionally, follow. Every time we deal successfully with infections of the tonsils or of the nasal sinuses we prevent the much graver pathological consequences of which these are often the forerunners.

All medicine is, in a sense, preventive in aim—that is to say, it endeavours to prevent the bad coming to the worse, even when no more optimistic outcome seems feasible. None of us can complacently boast that his mental and bodily structure is such as will never call for conscious attention. The nearest approach to practical wisdom in this matter is embodied in the maxim: A stitch in time saves nine. We inject anti-diphtheritic serum, or send a "delicate" child away into the country, or walk briskly five miles before breakfast, or have our drains attended to, or include iodine, or thyroid, or even

digitalis in our daily dietary as differing pathologic tendencies indicate. And, in all these measures, the curative and the preventive are closely interblended.

It is not easy for a practising physician or surgeon, inevitably preoccupied with symptoms and urgent consequences, habitually to take that wide view of phenomenal sequence and interrelation which is necessary if light is to be thrown on the great problems of prevention. There is a well-known Hippocratic saying that "to know the nature of man, one must know the nature of all things"; to which may be appended the maxim of an old Spanish physician: "If you only know medicine, you don't know that."

Preventive medicine is of two kinds. There is the kind which is concerned with external dangers, and concentrates on keeping those dangers at a distance or, alternatively, on taking steps to lessen our susceptibility to them by what is called immunization. The very great fall in both the death-rate and the sickness rate in the last half-century is mainly due to measures such as these. It is with this kind of medicine that our public health authorities are mainly occupied.

There is another sort of preventive medicine which has not been adequately exploited. This has to do with remedial treatment at a very early stage of physical or psychic abnormality or irregularity— long before most of us believe ourselves ill or in need of medical attention. We are always hearing and reading about the importance of checking disease at its beginning, before it has caused structural or organic lesions beyond repair. It is almost certain that, if we could recognize the true beginning of a disease, we should be in a position, nine times out of ten, to prevent its getting much farther.

What we commonly call the beginnings of an illness are the beginnings of its acute stage. For effective prevention, what we need to recognize are the small initial variations which, if neglected gradually and steadily pass from indifferent to bad, and from bad to worse. The real nature of these initial divagations would almost certainly enlighten us as to their cause. Unfortunately, apart from those diseases which are known to be caused by germs, even the doctors do not know where most of our disorders have their real source. Until we know these things it is a mere beating of the air to exhort us to deal with illness before it has made us feel ill.

Our national reputation for muddling through is not without foundation. In times of stress we encourage our methodical scientists to devise plans of reconstruction. More than twenty

years ago, at the request of the Minister of Health, an authoritative Committee, under the Chairmanship of Lord Dawson, presented a carefully thought-out Report on the "Future Provision of Medical and Allied Services." In the same year, a parallel Report was prepared for the Scottish Board of Health by a Consultative Council of which Sir Donald MacAlister was Chairman and Dr. Norman Walker was Vice-Chairman. Both reports embody thoroughly sound and practicable proposals for a national medical service. They were subjected to little adverse criticism. As usual, however, hardly an item of either scheme was acted on. Four years ago, the organization known as P.E.P., after an elaborate study by more than a hundred recognized experts in matters appertaining to health, prepared a report on the British Health Services. An epitomised version of this report has since been issued as a sixpenny Penguin book, with an admirable and applauding Foreword by Lord Horder. Here, again, an excellent practical scheme of reconstruction is presented, in no essential way discordant with the reports prepared for the Ministry of Health seventeen years earlier. Again, the suggestions received practically universal approval. What are we waiting for?

The first steps towards the materialization of a truly national medical service are so obvious, and—compared with our present daily national expenditure—so collectively inexpensive, whilst at the same time so little disturbing to existing personal interests, that there seems no excuse for our not getting ready to take those steps directly the war is over. How are we to set about it? First of all, the country should be divided into regional units—not necessarily coinciding with existing counties or other administrative units—each with a regional council responsible for the provision and co-ordination of the hospital, specialist, and domiciliary medical services within its area. The local authorities within the area, the voluntary and provided hospitals, and the general practitioners should all be represented on this council. These regional councils should, while possessed of considerable local autonomy, be ultimately subordinate to the Ministry of Health. They should be concerned solely with problems of health. The organizations should centre round a large hospital, preferably a teaching hospital of the University type. In all towns with populations of 10,000 or over, there should be secondary hospitals staffed by salaried surgeons, physicians, and specialists. In the smaller towns, there should be adequately but more simply equipped hospitals of the cottage hospital

type, staffed mostly or entirely by the local general practitioners. Between the practitioners and these three grades of hospitals and the specialists connected therewith, there should be full co-operation. Through the family doctor, all the auxiliary health services—specialists of all kinds, pathologists, oculists, gynæcologists, surgeons and so on, as well as institutional amenities—should be mediated.

The function of the whole of the service should be the maintenance of the highest possible state of health throughout the community. The existing gaps between preventive and remedial medicine should be bridged over, and it should be realized that there can be no hard and fast differentiation of function between the preventers and the curers of disease. The province of the senior health officer and of such direct assistants as he may need should, like that of the present medical officers of health, be mainly preventive. He should take no part in the actual domiciliary treatment of sick persons; but the intimate relation existing between him and the whole medical service should keep him in touch with realities in a way that no paper statistics ever can. The practitioners themselves, who alone are in a position to see at first hand the actual connection between individual illness and remediable conditions, should no longer feel that the latter is no concern of theirs, belonging—as is at present assumed—to another department of public service.

At the central clinic, every man, woman and child should be encouraged, even though in apparently good health, to come at annual or other stated intervals for thorough medical examination. In this way, the beginnings of all sorts of disorders could be recognized at a stage when they may comparatively easily be put right. In this way, also, might be collected really valuable information which should add considerably to the efficiency and usefulness of the doctors themselves.

"THE ONLY GOOD GERMAN IS A . . . . . ."

By Robert Powell

THIS is a remarkable war—no more remarkable the realist will say than most other wars. Yet a little reflection will show that never before has there been such strong assertions of difference between the ideals on both sides, nor more insistent demands, even while the issue is still undecided, from the British people that there should be definite and unambiguous official pronouncements as to the nature of the peace which is to follow this war.

This does not mean that it would be advisable or even possible to state now the explicit terms, but this does not exclude the contention that the time has come to give a practical indication of the lines along which the peace shall be established. It is as though we should say it is too early to place the milestones on the peace road but that the direction of the road along which we are moving must be clearly revealed. We have said we are fighting for freedom and democracy—for the triumph, nay, for the very preservation of those Christian virtues upon which our civilization has been built up. If we believe this sincerely, then we mean that our new world will be based upon these principles.

Even though we might concede something to those who say that we can only look at the negative side of the problem and can determine simply what we *cannot*, or *will not* do, we shall have made great progress. For to remember and remain true to those conclusions which our experience and common sense dictated to us after the World War would mean a great deal. Much has to be said against the Nazis and against those other Germans who have acquiesced in the duplicity and crimes, the terrors and horrors, which have been committed in the name of the Third Reich. But even in wartime it is surely necessary to allow our judgments to be governed as much as possible by the judicious spirit, and to remember that the type of wartime propaganda which indicts a whole nation, is common to both sides and is not the whole truth in either case. In a much-read pamphlet appear the words: "To mankind as

a whole, Germans have brought nothing but misery in all its forms—force and fraud, fraud and force; that is the old German gospel."* If we substituted British for German how easy would it be to produce hundreds of similar expressions in Nazi literature! This denunciation is logically on a par with Hitler's very broad generalizations against the "pluto-democratic" British or the Jews. If we accept such an all-embracing denunciation it is impossible to see where we are to find the Germans with whom to make a real peace, or why we talk about the difficult task of "cleansing and educating" German youth, if it is always to be blasted with an unchangeable nature!

We talk much about democracy, but British people who have lived long on the Continent would agree that it is not the virtues of democracy which a foreigner would say are most outstanding in the attitude of those British official representatives with whom he had to deal.

Even at the expense of repeating facts which we ignore so often let us take a hasty glance back over the 23 years since the end of the World War. Opinions may differ as to the Versailles Treaty, whether its terms were too harsh or too lenient. But little enough attention has been paid to the character and outlook of the men and institutions largely responsible for executing those terms. Condemn Nazi Germany as we will, yet nobody who knew that country from 1918 to 1933, can deny that "the Germany which might have set the helm to quite another course and saved Europe from a fresh catastrophe never received due support from abroad. It was a very fine German who wrote:†

> What was the state of affairs in Central Europe in 1918? The Right had been struck to the ground; it was among the circles of the Left that those ideas for which the victorious Western peoples stood found warm adherents. Unfortunately, the individuals who came to Central Europe to represent the West were themselves no friends to those ideas. Exceptions of course there were; I speak of the generality. This coloured the reports from Central Europe to the Western Governments, and it strengthened the hands of those who had suffered a double defeat, in the war with the foreign enemy and the war with the enemy at home. It really looked as if the upper class on the one side was anxiously concerned to restore the half-destroyed upper class on the other side—the class with which it had been wont for generations past to wage war, to conclude peace and again wage war. That at any rate was the appearance, and the appearance was enough to affect the

*_Black Record_, by Sir Robert Vansittart, is reviewed on another page by E. Muller Sturmheim.

†Rudolf Olden in _Is Germany a Hopeless Case?_

> subsequent course of things . . . . It was inevitable, whether one thinks it a good or an evil, that the sympathies and antipathies shown by the victorious powers influenced the shape which things assumed in Germany.

Reading these words written by one who boldly opposed Hitler, in connection with, for example, Sir Robert Vansittart's brochure, it is interesting to note that the latter's devastating condemnation of certain German atrocities are too often based upon his experience of one class only, and that of the ruling student corps (Borussia, etc.); unfortunately, the class which, to the British diplomat, constituted Germany.

Have the Germans changed at all? How easy it is to answer in the negative, especially in the midst of a war! Yet if we compare 1914 with 1939, this is what we see. In 1914, it was possible to line the Reichstag behind the Reichswehr and to lead the nation into a world war by the help of a few tricks and lies. A quarter of a century later, in 1939, such an end was achieved only after the destruction of freedom of expression, the creation of the Gestapo, the concentration camp, the People's Court and a specious solution of the unemployment problem. It may truly be said that the Germans have again allowed themselves to be hoodwinked—but not as easily as formerly. At the same time, any unbiassed observer of European events from 1933 to 1938 would have to admit that the average Briton was also hoodwinked by certain leaders whose ignorance of the true state of affairs in Germany and of Nazi psychology was only equalled by their belief in Hitler as their protector against Bolshevism!

The small nations now oppressed by the Third Reich and even many of the Germans themselves are looking to Britain for a new and greater solution of the present problem than the Nazis can give. This problem is only partly the problem of Germany. It is essentially the problem of Europe, and of modern civilization. As far as Germany is concerned, past experience and the war aims which we profess should exclude immediately some of the proposals heard in certain quarters. Thus on the political side, to split up Germany into its various component states and keep them forcibly apart in order to prevent the Reich getting too strong again is to provide an exaggerated German nationalism once more with its propaganda material. Economically, we may talk much about such things as sanctions and reparations but unemployment after 1919, the plight of the export coal trade, etc. point the moral.

Britain has to be prepared with a European plan which will

make a greater appeal than Hitler's "New Order," and be established upon principles which appeal to the best in the human spirit.

The German wants a European solution to his problem. Stresemann, in 1929, was publicly advocating a federation of Europe (and remember the 1928 elections had given him a majority in the Reichstag). Yet we gave him no practical help. Five years after Locarno he was still waiting for the smallest concession in order to counteract German Nationalist chauvinism at home. But we failed him and helped considerably to persuade the average German of the truth of the slogan *Wehrlos . . . . Ehrlos* (without aims, without honour). With what bitterness did Stresemann exclaim toward the end of his life, to a British journalist:

> Nothing remains now, nothing remains now except brute force. The future is in the hands of the new generation. And the youth of Germany, which we might have won for peace and for the new Europe, we both lost. This is my tragedy and your crime.

Could we do better than ponder this remarkable prophecy of April, 1929, in the light of succeeding events?

Nowadays, certain people glibly remark that "the only good German is a dead one" and appear to imagine that such a mere expression of opinion automatically ends discussion. But have not such persons fallen into the Nazi mistake of attributing the crime to race and not to tradition? Even were we to accept their viewpoint, who is to carry out the murder of 60,000,000 people? Will these people do it, and have they considered the effect upon themselves of such action?

Looking more deeply into the problem of the present war it becomes clearer that it is the result of a clash of ideas. Will it not therefore be the greatest tragedy if through the defeat of the Nazis their opportunity for enforcing wrong ideas upon the rest of the world is removed, we, the victors, turn round and apply such ideas ourselves?

Recently the present writer sat in a café discussing the problem of the future Germany with exiles from the continent. Among them was a Pole who had just received (via Sweden) news of his family left behind in Poland. His aged mother had been turned out of her old farm to provide accommodation for a German family from the Baltic. She had been compelled to leave for Warsaw with only some hand luggage. For over a month his little nieces had been unable to go outside the house because of lack of clothes. Yet this was his only comment:

"We've got to understand this German problem, and find a *civilized* solution which will make such things impossible."

This man understood what so many people either do not know or too readily forget, that this war is part of a great evolution of the human spirit which is showing itself, even though catastrophically, in present events. As so often in the past the *Zeitgeist* has found its most extreme expression in Germany. But is it not fundamentally similar, though not perhaps in intensity, to the struggle which is going on in this country also?

Britain's attitude toward this whole problem is of vital importance to the world's future. If we base our actions upon a belief that Germany consists only of a certain class, if class consciousness is going to cause us to give official support only to a certain class in Germany, then we must say that that country is irredeemable. But by so doing we shall only ignore at our peril the repercussions which this must have here at home. For after all most people still believe we are fighting for democracy and Christianity. And this means that our solution of both our own problems at home and of the German problem must be along the lines which those great principles dictate.

(*Mr. Robert Powell, it will be remembered, spent seven years as a journalist in Berlin.*)

THE BALKAN THEATRE

By Major-General Sir Charles Gwynn

IN the Balkan theatre the curtain will probably have risen for the second act before this appears in print.

The first act in its Albanian setting is still in progress, and it is possible that the Greek offensive there may considerably modify the strategical situation before the opening of the second act. We are still, however, doubtful what actors will appear on the stage in the second act, for the war of nerves is in full blast.

It is therefore difficult to decide what hypothesis to accept in reviewing the strategical situation. What should we assume are Germany's real intentions? Does she mean to use her base in Bulgaria for an attack on Turkey, in order to secure possession of the Straits and an outlet into the Mediterranean, as a first step in an ultimate drive towards Egypt and the Iraq oilfields?

Or is her object, in the first instance at least, merely to secure economic and political control over the Balkan peninsula while at the same time helping her Italian partner to escape from a dangerous situation?

Whatever her ultimate intentions may be I think we may safely accept the latter hypothesis and assume that Germany's immediate military objective is the defeat of Greece; although this may involve her in limited operation against Turkey and a war with Yugoslavia. Hitler has always shown a preference for a step by step strategy and it would seem improbable that he would embark on a far-reaching campaign through Turkey until he had secured an undisturbed base in the Balkans. Bulgaria alone would form an inadequate base for a far-reaching campaign through Turkey, especially if operations were still in progress in Greece and possibly also in Yugoslavia. The enigmatic attitude of Russia also tends to limit the scope of German operations.

Put in its simplest terms let us assume that Germany's intention is to invade Greece from Bulgaria while Italy co-operates by staging a counter-offensive in Albania. The

occupation of Eastern Macedonia and the capture of Salonika would then obviously be the German primary objective. From Bulgaria the main avenue of approach to Salonika is by the Struma Valley and, as far as the frontier, it is served by a railway and a good road. At the frontier, however, the railway ends and a strong defensive position at the Rupel Pass would be encountered. Moreover, the Struma and hills in the neighbourhood of Salonika are highly defensible. Further east the Rhodope mountains form a considerable obstacle to invasion; passes are few, roads indifferent and run through heavily afforested country. Invasion of Greece, from Bulgaria alone, is therefore by no means easy and affords few opportunities for the employment of mechanized troops. The defence of her long frontier in its eastern extension would, however, obviously tax Greece's resources; and it is here that Turkish assistance would be needed to prevent the coast line falling into German hands.

For a German invasion of Greece the attitude of Yugoslavia is, however, the all important factor. If she yielded to German demands and gave Germany an unopposed passage by the railway and roads leading down the Vardar Valley, and Italy a passage through her south-western districts and Monastir, Greek defences would be sorely tried. On the other hand, if Yugoslavia stood firm to protect her neutrality she could undoubtedly make invasion of Greece through her territory a formidable undertaking; and she might also be able to spare troops, who in co-operation with the Greeks, would make Italy's position in Albania precarious. Unfortunately the whole of northern Yugoslavia could be overrun by the Germans without diverting forces required for operations through Bulgaria, and without adding to congestion on Bulgarian lines of communication. With her immense resources Germany could afford to open a new front. In face of that threat will Yugoslavia stand firm in defence of her neutrality? Obviously she hopes, by offering a firm front and by making defensive preparations, to maintain her independence; and, equally, Germany hopes by threats, veiled or open, to avoid the use of force. It is of course for Yugoslavia to consider how much of her independence will be left if she yields to threats.

The attitude of Turkey is much clearer than that of Yugoslavia but it is not without its ambiguities. She would certainly resist invasion in any form; and attempts by the Germans to advance down the Maritsa Valley on Dedeagatch would almost certainly be taken as a threat to her security and lead to her

active intervention. It does not seem certain, however, whether, in case Germany kept well clear of Turkish frontiers, and confined her operations mainly to the Struma and Vardar routes, Turkey would feel bound to take action to assist Greece, necessitating offensive action.

So far, neither Germans nor Bulgarians appear to have made preparations for an attack on Turkey; and such troops as have been sent to the frontier seem to have a defensive, precautionary rôle. Turkey also has taken precautionary measures and, as she holds strong positions, preparations for an attack on her could hardly be concealed.

It seems probable that Germany hopes that Turkey will stand aloof while Greece is attacked; but if she intervenes it would be unlike the Germans to remain on the defensive. Turkey's strategic position therefore deserves examination. Her European frontier has a length of about 200 miles nearly equally divided between her Bulgarian and Greek neighbours. Near the point of junction is the strongly defended fortress town of Adrianople which commands the main roads and railway from Bulgaria. East of Adrianople the greater part of the frontier region is hilly and defensible, and in order to turn Adrianople the main avenue for invading troops runs from the Bulgarian port of Burgas to the Turkish town of Kirk-Kilisse. The frontier with Greece runs south from Adrianople along the Maritsa River; but, once that river is crossed, the valley of its tributary, the Ergene, provides terrain suitable for mechanized operations, traversed by roads and the main railway lines from Sofia and Salonika to Istambul. The approaches to Istambul are, however, covered by two strong lines of fortification—a new outer position, and the famous old Chatalja lines, which no doubt have been modernized. The Gallipoli peninsula is also protected by the fortifications of the Bulair isthmus which, by the way, face outwards and not inwards as was so often assumed when we were on Gallipoli. Turkey's position on her European front is therefore undoubtedly strong and effectively covers approaches to the Dardanelles and Bosporus which of themselves provide a third line of defence to her Asiatic territory. It cannot be said, however, that her footing in Europe forms an adequate base for offensive land operations on a large scale; either into eastern Greece or Bulgaria. Limited offensive operations by Turkey might, however, force Germany, if she were invading Greece, to divert part of her resources to protect her flank. Turkey might also lend valuable assistance to Greece by providing

bases for offensive air operations, directed against German communications and the Rumanian oilfields. The passes through the Rhodope and Balkan mountains and defiles in the Vardar valleys offer vulnerable targets; and, although oil wells are too numerous and too small to be sensitive to attack, refining works, and the barges and railway system used for the transportation of oil, together with the labour employed on them, undoubtedly invite attack.

It is of course Turkey's command of the Straits which makes her power of defence of extreme strategic importance and which affects so many interests, those of Russia especially. While Turkey denies the passage of the Straits to foreign warships the Black Sea is essentially a Russian lake. If she allowed British warships to pass the Straits without Russia's acquiescence it would almost certainly mean war and involve the necessity of defending her Asiatic as well as her European frontiers. That would produce a situation Turkish resources could not be expected to meet.

On the other hand, under certain conditions Russia's acquiescence in the use of the Straits by our Navy might be obtainable. If there were any danger of Germany securing control of the Straits Russia's strategic position would be undermined. With Germany in possession of the Straits Italian and possibly German submarines might appear in the Black Sea to supplement such submarines and E-boats as Germany may assemble at Rumanian and Bulgarian ports. Supported by a German air force, mosquito flotillas would make Russia's domination of the Black Sea illusory. Russian attempts to exercise a right of veto on the use of the Straits would entail a war with Germany instead of with Turkey. If there were a danger of such a situation developing Russia might well acquiesce in any step which would strengthen the position of Turkey. Whether the Royal Navy would be willing to engage in operations in the Black Sea is a different matter, but obviously the command of the Straits must affect the line up of strategic interests. Although Russia has power of bringing pressure on Turkey actual open conflict would weaken her power of exercising influence on Germany. Moreover, in any conflict with Turkey Caucasian oilfields would be exposed to air attack. Russia has already shown her alarm at the German advance into Bulgaria and that alone is an indication that she would not view German control of the Straits with equanimity. She has therefore few inducements to seek a quarrel with Turkey.

On the whole my reading of the strategic situation in the

Balkans is that Germany intends for the present to limit her operations there. An attack on Greece should bring relief to her Axis partner and if successful it would further enhance her prestige. She presumably also hopes it will cause her main enemy, Britain, to disperse her strength and impose a further strain on British shipping and naval resources.

If the attack on Greece involves use of Yugoslav territory she will employ force if necessary to obtain it. She would naturally prefer to obtain control over Yugoslavia without fighting but she could employ force without materially disturbing her strategic position.

If Turkey intervenes to assist Greece I should expect Germany, for the time being at least, to attempt to localize the conflict, and in deference to Russian sensibilities, not to attempt an advance to the Straits. A defensive policy on land and intensive air action might be expected in view of Turkey's limited power of offensive action and strong defensive position.

An ultimate far-reaching offensive against Turkey might of course be undertaken, but it would involve an entanglement offering few inducements. Even if the Iraq oilfields were reached it is not easy to see how the oil from them could be transported to Germany while Britain dominates the Mediterranean. It is improbable that the oilfields could be captured intact. Moreover, railway communications passing through long tunnels can easily be interrupted by demolitions. In any case the fact that the Turkish railway system is separated from that of Europe by unbridged water-lines would make the provision of rolling stock on Turkish railways a difficult problem for an invader.

If Britain can be defeated elsewhere nothing can check Germany's expansion to the East, but there are evidently more direct ways of attacking her than through Turkey. It is therefore not surprising that Turkey realizes that her future depends on a British victory. The part Britain may play in the Balkans is, obviously, not open to discussion.

THE WAR AT SEA

By Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond

THE month—mid-February to mid-March—has witnessed several important events in the war at sea in four principal categories: the intensification of the enemy's efforts against commerce, the operations in East Africa and in the Indian Ocean and Red Sea, the adoption of a minor strategy of raids upon enemy positions, and the threat by Admiral Darlan of using the French navy to convoy food stuffs through the British blockade.

After some weeks of reduced losses between October and January during which the sinkings of our shipping fell steadily from their high level, the beginning of the year showed an increase. Between November and March a total of 867,003 tons was sunk by the combined offensives of the submarine, aircraft, surface raiders and mines. The week ending March 2 was a bad one. 102,871 tons of British and 45,167 of allied and neutral shipping were lost. Though the total of 148,038 tons was considerably less than the 432,500 claimed by the enemy the figures are obviously serious, whether regarded in the light of tons of shipping or of the cargoes that were on their homeward and outward voyages, but without knowledge of the quantities sunk by each of the four separate agencies it is not possible to make any detailed examination of the situation. How much, for instance, was sunk by mines, and to what extent have we found the answer to the latest types of enemy mines; what has been effected by the surface raiders; how much of the losses in the Western Approaches is due to aircraft acting alone and how much to co-operation between aircraft and submarines or surface ships? One thing however is plain. We need more escorting vessels and craft. The arming of the merchantmen has shown itself a useful measure, for weak though the armaments necessarily are, they have proved a hindrance to attacking aircraft, and on some occasions have brought the enemy down when he descended to a low enough level to make an effective shot. The main defence must however rest with the escorts and we cannot have too many

of them. Happily the prospects of a considerable increase in their numbers appears favourable, for our own shipyards and those of the Dominions are filled with sloops and corvettes and other small types suitable for this service, and there now seems to be reason to expect a respectable addition of destroyers and motor boats from the United States since the passage of the "Lease and Lend" Bill. All this process of production however takes time. Even now, some months after the decision to transfer fifty American destroyers to Britain, all of them are not yet in service, for, built as they were several years ago, and for service in conditions different from those of to-day, a considerable amount of reconstruction and rearmament has proved necessary.

It is most sincerely to be hoped that the lessons of the perilous days through which we are passing will not be lost upon the people of this country and of the outer Dominions, but will bring home to all of them certain facts to which far too little attention has been paid during recent years. The first of these is that of the utter uselessness of relying upon engagements designed to impose limitations upon the military activities of other Powers. Every success that the two enemies have achieved has been through deliberate violation of engagements into which they had voluntary entered, from the invasion of neutral states to the use of submarines against merchant ships. To trust to either Germany or Italy in the future to observe any engagements into which they may enter would, it is plain, be madness. The next, arising partly out of this, is that the means of protecting our trade must exist when war breaks out. Even small craft cannot be produced in the numbers needed fast enough to cope with the dangers from the submarine and the air, while cruisers, which take a longer time to build must be ready for service on the ocean routes at once, as they were on the outbreak of the war of 1914-18 when we possessed over 120 of them; and even then had to add to them during the war. Lastly it needs to be understood that the ability of a merchant navy to stand punishment is proportional to its tonnage. The several members of the British Commonwealth cannot afford to be indifferent, as they have been in recent years, to the decline of merchant tonnage under the pressure of subsidized merchant marines of the other Powers. Just as a boxer can stand punishment if he is in condition, so a merchant fleet can only stand it if it is numerous.

There have been many reports of activity of armed enemy vessels on the trade routes particularly in the Pacific and Indian

Ocean, but particulars of losses and of counter action have been wanting. The First Lord, in his speech on the Navy Estimates said that "during the past few months our ships have gained contact with a number of raiders. Sometimes the action was broken off by the enemy, but he did not get away without suffering damage. In fact not every raider met has lived to raid another day although I fear I cannot tell the House about that." No one will complain of this reticence. If a raider has been sunk we do not wish the enemy to know of the loss and at once to replace her with another. It is also encouraging to observe that the First Lord now recognizes the fallacy which underlay the cruiser provisions of the Treaty of London which assumed that the strength of our cruiser forces was related to that of some other Power or Powers. "For a war against an enemy of consequence, the volume of our trade which has to be protected, and the length of our lines of movement and supply, necessitate a certain absolute strength in the various classes of ships which is essential for the exercise of our sea power." It is to be regretted that this fact, well known to all who had made any study of sea warfare, was hidden from those who negotiated the suicidal treaty which expressed our needs in relative, in place of absolute terms, and adopted a figure so patently below our needs as fifty ships.

On the ocean routes the foundation of the strategy of defence is the convoy system. There was a theory both before and during the early stages of the last war, that the protection of trade would best be achieved by "hunting down" the enemy: a process which Mahan many years before had compared with looking for a needle in a bottle of hay, and which proved as fruitless in practice as that process. The essence of the convoy system is that the defending escort is strong enough to meet and defeat such forces as the enemy may reasonably be expected to bring against it. The enemy has several obvious and familiar courses open to him. He can fit out the comparatively few armed vessels he sends out—few, that is to say in comparison with the number of defending vessels that are needed—with more efficient and more perfect armaments than our own—he can, for instance furnish them with fire control apparatus which gives them a marked advantage over vessels without that apparatus. He can work his commerce raiders in company so as to be sure of a superiority over the defence—that is a very old practice of our former enemies from the hey-day of the French *guerre de course* to the war of 1812. It is indeed an obvious course to adopt. Or, again, he may

strengthen his armed raiders with a backing of men of war, or (as the Germans sent out their armoured cruiser *Graf Spee*) employ his cruisers upon raiding. The need therefore for stiffening our cruiser escorts is plain.

The campaign in East Africa affects the security of the sea routes. By the captures of Mogadishu and Kismayu the enemy is deprived of two useful harbours from which it may safely be assumed his raiders have worked in the Indian Ocean, fuelling and getting other supplies, resting and disposing of prisoners. It is not improbable that the capture of those ports had some bearing on the interception of the small raider *Ramb I*; and this, combined with the mining of the lesser Strait of Bab el Mandeb, and, as we may reasonably hope, the not far distant fall of Massawa, should materially affect the security of the Eastern trade, the more particularly as the vessels now needed to protect shipping in the Red Sea against the attacks by submarine, destroyer and aerial attacks from that port will be set free for services elsewhere.

The successful raid upon the oil plants in the Lofoten Islands is, it is to be hoped, the forerunner of more operations of the same nature. No one imagines that blows of this kind have a decisive character: they are contributory only. They serve three purposes: depriving the enemy of some supplies of which he is in need, or of the facilities of a particular position; imposing on him the need for garrisons in a number of places and thus dissipating his forces; and affording encouragement to the unhappy folk in the occupied lands. Combined operations of this kind are difficult and dangerous—General Abercromby, the victor in the battle of Alexandria, remarked of them: "There are risks in a British warfare that are unkown in any other service." They require the most careful preparation, an exact definition of their object, perfect equipment, surprise and speed in execution, and a very high measure of individual skill both in the command and in the ranks. All of these appear to have been present in the Lofoten raid. British operations of this nature have not infrequently failed in consequence of delays, vacillations in the Cabinet, leakages of information and insufficiency of force, but none of these errors seem to have marred this expedition. On the other hand the same perfection does not seem to have attended the landing on the Italian island of Castellorizo. Judging by the wording of the first communiqué it would appear that the intention was to obtain possession of that place: "Castellorizo, a small Italian island with a seaplane base in the Eastern Mediterranean, was

occupied by our forces on Tuesday, February 25." (*Times*, Feb. 27). A few days later we were told that it had been "evacuated." In view of the Italian report that it had been recaptured by their forces, and making every allowance for the untruthfulness which characterizes Italian utterances, the communiqué seems wanting in frankness; and one is left with the impression that the old error of sending forces too small for their task has been repeated.

Admiral Darlan's threat to convoy French shipping cannot be interpreted in any other way than as the expression of a desire to bring France into the war on the side of the Axis, since it is manifestly a strategical impossibility for the French Navy to defend a convoy on its way to Marseilles against the superior British naval force at Gibraltar. It can therefore have no other object than to embroil France with Britain. The result would be to add to the Axis strength one modern battleship—assuming the *Jean Bart* has been completed—one battle-cruiser (the *Strasbourg*, presumably repaired by now) about eight cruisers and a large number of lighter craft and submarines; while the French ports in Africa and in the colonies would be at the disposal of our enemies. No wonder the Germans have made their so-called "generous" offer to return to France a small portion of the food stuffs of which they had robbed her in order to acquire this most useful addition to their means of bringing Britain to her knees! The threat is one of a kind to which this country has been exposed on a number of occasions in the past, when, employing her economic weapon, she has been faced with opposition and the possibility that, if she used it to the full, her actual power of using it might be impaired through the addition of another navy to the forces of the enemy. But it is no less obvious that the Admiral, for all his bellicose attitude and his strange anti-British outlook, is not anxious hurriedly to put his threat into execution, for he has said that he intends to wait and see what answer Britain may make. He is well aware that one result would be to cut off those supplies which Great Britain is now permitting to leak through her blockade into Marseilles, and that, unless he can expect an early victory of the Axis-cum-France, the result of her joining our enemies would be to increase the rigours of the French situation.

FORGIVENESS AND THE ENEMY

By Dorothy L. Sayers

FORGIVENESS is a very difficult matter. Many varieties of behaviour go by that name, and not all of them are admirable. There is the kind that says: "I forgive her as a Christian, but I shall never speak to her again." This is adequately dealt with by the caustic definition: "Christian forgiveness, which is no forgiveness at all," and need not be discussed, any more than the self-interest of those who

> Drink the champagne that she sends them
> But they never can forget.

There is also the priggish variety, which greets persecution with the ostentatious announcement, "I forgive you, Jones, and I will pray for you." This, though it can base itself strongly on ethical and scriptural sanction, shares with pacifism the serious practical disadvantage of so inflaming the evil passions of Jones that if the injured party had malignantly determined to drive Jones to the devil he could scarcely have hit upon a surer way. There is the conditional: "I will forgive you on condition you say you are sorry and never do it again." That has about it something which smacks too much of a legal bargain, and we are forced to remember that no man is so free from trespass himself that he can afford to insist on conditions. Only God is in a position to do that; and we recall the Catholic teaching that confession, contrition and amendment are the necessary conditions of absolution. But if we assert that Divine forgiveness is of this bargaining kind, we meet with a thundering denial from poet and prophet and from God Himself:

> Doth Jehovah forgive a debt only on condition that it shall
> Be payed? Doth he forgive Pollution only on conditions of Purity?
> That Debt is not forgiven! That Pollution is not forgiven!
> Such is the forgiveness of the gods, the moral virtues of the
> Heathen, whose tender mercies are cruelty. But Jehovah's salvation
> Is without money and without price, in the continual forgiveness of
> sins,
> In the perpetual mutual sacrifice in great eternity. For behold!
> There is none that liveth and sinneth not! And this is the covenant

Of Jehovah. "If you forgive one another, so shall Jehovah forgive you;
That He Himself may dwell among you."

(Blake: *Jerusalem*).

God's conditions, it appears, are of another kind. There is nothing about demanding repentance and restitution or promises not to offend again: we must forgive unconditionally if we hope to be forgiven ourselves: "as we forgive our debtors"—"unto seventy times seven."

The whole teaching of the New Testament about forgiveness is haunted by paradox and enigma, and cannot be summed up in any phrase about simple kindliness. "Whether is easier: to say *Thy sins be forgiven thee* or to say, *Arise and walk*. But that ye may know that the Son of Man hath power on earth to forgive sins (then saith He to the sick of the palsy) Arise, take up thy bed and go." The irony is so profound that we are not certain which way to take it. "Do you think forgiveness is something glib and simple? To be sure—it is just as simple as *this*. Does it seem to you formidably difficult? To be sure, so is *this*—but you see it can be done." Whereat, according to St. Luke, everybody, though pleased, was a little alarmed and thought it a very odd business.

It may be easier to understand what forgiveness is, if we first clear away misconceptions about what it does. It does not wipe out the consequences of the sin. The words and images used for forgiveness in the New Testament frequently have to do with the cancellation of a debt: and it is scarcely necessary to point out that when a debt is cancelled, this does not mean that the money is miraculously restored from nowhere. It means only that the obligation originally due from the borrower is voluntarily discharged by the lender. If I injure you and you mulct me in damages, then I bear the consequences; if you forbear to prosecute, then you bear the consequences. If the injury is irreparable, and you are vindictive, injury is added to injury; if you are forgiving and I am repentant, then we share the consequences and gain a friendship. But in every case the consequences are borne by somebody. The Parable of the Unmerciful Servant adds a further illuminating suggestion: that forgiveness is not merely a mutual act, but a social act. If injuries are not forgiven all round, the grace of pardon is made ineffective, and the inexorable judgment of the Law is forced into operation.

One thing emerges from all this: that forgiveness is not a doing-away of consequences; nor is it primarily a remission

of punishment. A child may be forgiven and "let off" punishment, or punished and then forgiven; either way may bring good results. But no good will come of leaving him unpunished and unforgiven. Forgiveness is the re-establishment of a right relationship, in which the parties can genuinely feel and behave as freely with one another as though the unhappy incident had never taken place. But it is impossible to enjoy a right relationship with an offender who, when pardoned, continues to behave in an obdurate and unsocial manner to the injured party and to those whom he has injured, because there is something in him that obstructs the relationship. So that, while God does not, and man dare not, demand repentance as a condition for *bestowing* pardon, repentance remains an essential condition for *receiving* it. Hence the Church's twofold insistence—first that repentance is necessary, and secondly that all sin is pardoned instantly in the mere fact of the sinner's repentance. Nobody has to sit about being humiliated in the outer office while God despatches important business, before condescending to issue a stamped official discharge accompanied by an improving lecture. Like the Father of the Prodigal Son, God can see repentance coming a great way off and is there to meet it, and the repentance *is* the reconciliation.

If God does not stand upon His dignity with penitent sinners, still less, one would suppose, should we. But then, God is not inhibited, as we are, by unrepented sins of His own. It is when the injuries have been mutual that forgiveness becomes so complicated, since, as La Rochefoucauld truly observes, it is very difficult to forgive those whom we have injured. The only fruitful line of thought to follow is, perhaps, to bear in mind that forgiveness has no necessary concern with payment or non-payment of reparations; its aim is the establishment of a free relationship. This aim is in no way advanced by mutual recrimination, or by the drawing-up of a detailed account to ascertain which side, on balance, is the more aggrieved party. If both were equally and immediately repentant, forgiveness—mutual and instantaneous—would *be* the right relationship.

But are there not crimes which are unforgivable? or which, we at any rate, find we cannot bring ourselves to forgive? At the present moment, that is a question which we are bound to ask ourselves. And it is here, especially, that we must make a great effort to clear our minds of clutter. The issue is not really affected by arguments about who began first, or whether bombs or blockade are the more legitimate weapon to use against women and children, or whether a civilian is a military

objective; nor need we object that no amount of forgiveness will do away with the consequences of the crimes—since we have already seen that forgiveness is not incompatible with consequence. The real question is this: When the war comes to an end, is there going to be anything in our minds, or in the minds of the enemy, that will prevent the re-establishment of a right relationship? That relationship need not necessarily be one of equal power on either side, and it need not exclude proper preventive measures against a renewal of the conflict—those considerations are again irrelevant. Are there any crimes that in themselves make forgiveness and right relations impossible?

If we again look at the New Testament, we shall find that what some people, with unconscious sarcasm, persist in calling "the simple Gospel," presents us, as usual, with a monstrous and shattering paradox. The most spectacular sin recorded there is the deliberate murder of God; and it is forgiven on the grounds that "they know not what they do." Is ignorance, then, an excuse? Can a man qualify for Heaven by pleading that he cannot tell right from wrong? Is not that the most damning of all disabilities—the final blasphemy that "shall not be forgiven, neither in this world, nor in the world to come"? Here is a distinction drawn like a sword at a point which we can scarcely see on the map.

Or perhaps the dividing line is clear enough, after all. The soldiers who crucified God had not, it is true, the heroic imagination that could see beyond their plain military duty to the eternal verities. But there was nothing in their ignorant hearts impenetrable to light. To such dim glimpses as they had, they seem to have responded. One ran for the hyssop; another said: "Indeed, there was something divine about this criminal." Forgiveness might work here and find no obstruction. But those others—all of them highly respectable people—had seen the healing power of God blaze in their eyes like the sun; they looked it full in the face, and said that it was the devil. This is the ultimate corruption that leaves no place for pardon; "I have so hardened my heart" (said the man in the iron cage) "that I *cannot* repent."

I do not know that we are in any position to judge our neighbours. But let us suppose that we ourselves are free from this corruption (are we?) and that we are ready to greet repentance with open arms and re-establish with our enemies a relationship in which old wrongs are as though they had never been. What are we to do with those who cannot accept

pardon when it is offered? And with those who have been corrupted from the cradle? Here, if anywhere, is the unforgivable—not in murdered citizens, ruined homes, broken churches, fire, sword, famine, pestilence, tortures, concentration camps and the enslavement of populations, but in the corruption of a whole generation, brought up to take a devil of destruction for the God of creation and to dedicate their noblest powers to the worship of that savage altar. If for the guilty there remains only the judgment of the millstone and the deep sea, we still have to ask ourselves: What are we to do with these innocents?

For whether is easier: To say, *Thy sins be forgiven thee?* or to say, *Arise and walk?* But that ye may know that the Son of Man hath power on earth to forgive sins (then saith He to the warped mind, the frozen brain, the starved heart, the stunted and paralysed soul) *Arise, take up thy bed and go to thy home.*

No: forgiveness is a difficult matter, and no man living is wholly innocent or wholly guilty. We, as a nation, are not very ready to harbour resentment, and sometimes this means that we forget without forgiving—that is, without ever really understanding either our enemy or ourselves. This time, we feel, forgetfulness will not be possible. If that is so and we make up our minds that no right relationship will ever be possible either, I do not quite see to what end we can look forward.

ROBERT GRAVES

A Traveller in the Desert

By Richard Church

WHAT Harold Munro did for English poetry during the two decades from 1912 has still to be put on record. The appreciation would not be a small one. Amongst other valuable service, he published Robert Graves's first book, *Over the Brazier*, in 1916, while the young poet, twenty-one years old, was on active service in France. Not much notice was taken of the book, although the boom in poetry, consequent upon Rupert Brooke's romantic death, had already begun.

A year later, *Fairies and Fusiliers*, appeared, with another publisher, at the same time as Robert Nicholls's *Faun's Holiday*, and the two poets began to be talked about as literary twins. Time quickly sorts out these chance relationships. It was not long before Robert Graves commanded singular attention. I recall a conversation which took place in 1919, soon after the Armistice, when an Earthly Paradise was being built at Versailles. Roger Ingpen had just started a small publishing business, and he and I were eating boiled eggs in W. H. Davies's dusty rooms in Great Russell Street. Davies had a shrewd instinct for new voices. I, a youngster then, listened reverently as he and Ingpen discussed the author of *Fairies and Fusiliers*. I remember one sentence exactly as it was uttered by Ingpen. He was a pale, ghostlike man, hesitant and absentminded, and usually spoke with his eyes half-shut as though the sound of his own voice were shattering his nerves. His emphasis at that moment was therefore the more startling. He said, "I believe Graves has the most perfect technique of any poet of his generation. He will survive most of them."

That was good prophecy. I do not hesitate to take it up, twenty years further along the corridor of time, and augment it with this recollection, and another shout of my own. For ever since that day, when I was introduced to Graves's work, I have not failed to find delight in it, and to watch its development.

That development, while not being inconsistent, has been devious, and in many respects disconcerting. Graves has published nineteen books of verse in all, and from them he made a volume, which he called *Collected Poems,* in 1938. In a preface, he explained why that collection was so austere. He found that during a period, after his marriage, he wrote verse most of which he has not cared to reprint. " Poetry to me at this time," he said in his Preface, " was neither a formal muse nor a familiar deity, but a hidden Janus (one head benignant, the other malevolent) whose unpredictable behaviour made the poet's task an impossible one."

Having come to this impasse, he set out to find the cause of it. This task caused him to throw out, as side-lines, a series of studies in technique and literary history : *On English Poetry, Poetic Unreason, Another Future of Poetry, Contemporary Techniques of Poetry.* " This preoccupation," he said further, " led me to a study of psychology; I was searching for some means of capturing and holding the reader's attention by hypnotic suggestion. I tended to make the test of a poem's worth not its internal coherence and truthfulness but its power to charm a large audience. Equally misguided was my recourse to philosophy to justify such poetic practice." The mere names of those books, together with his concluding remarks, show with what seriousness and curiosity this poet was watching himself and his work, and puzzling his mind to find out the truth of the relationship between the two. He went further than that, however, and in this further enquiry he was a forerunner of the generation which followed him, and to a large extent ignored him; the generation of Auden, Day Lewis, Spender and others, whose technique is slight, and whose theory of living is dogmatic and puerile, in comparison with those of Robert Graves.

Concluding his discussion of his own efforts towards a full consciousness of what he had been doing and what he was likely still to do, he said, " my essays on the psychology of poems gained wide currency and have done corresponding mischief." And turning from this introspective purpose to a more ethical one, he said " in 1925 I first became acquainted with the poems and critical work of Laura Riding, and in 1926 with herself; and slowly began to revise my whole attitude to poetry."

That revision is one which the critic to-day cannot freely examine without intruding upon privacies and personal relationships only hinted at by the poet here and in his famous prose autobiography, *Goodbye to all that.* Perhaps in fifty

years another critic will not be so restricted, and will be able to "chatter about Harriett" at great length, and win applause thereby. I doubt if he will get near the truth; for it is a truth which is still eluding the poet himself, and will forever elude him. We think we discover the heart of our purposes and impulses. We sit and brood, especially in our middle years, the strange noon-tide years of inaction, but the process is as futile as that of an onion which should endeavour to skin itself.

What influence Graves received at this time is incalculable. It is also temporary, for, as I shall try to show from his work, I believe that he is a creature who walks alone, though he is horrified by the solitude; and that his temperament will force him to do so until the end of the journey. Again and again he betrays a personality that cannot learn the technique of social relationships; one that is never restrained, even by painful experiences, to the necessary reserves, defensiveness, caution, business aplomb, diplomacy, or whatever we may care to call the procedure by which men and women make their way in the world. This perpetual innocence is a sign of the true poet. It may not be a virtue. Indeed, often it is the source of those obliquities of conduct and contract which make poets talked of as being feline, unreliable, irresponsible. Both Keats and W. B. Yeats have had much to say about this. In Yeats's own personality it often took the form of a deliberate malice, which in his old age broke out in a magnificent gesture of savagery and revolt, crystallizing into some of his finest verse.

What is so odd is, that this detachment usually is interrupted by periods of close, childlike dependence, either upon another individual, or upon some social acclamation, or both. The lives of Shelley and Browning will at once give examples of what I mean. The alternative give and take of these two extremes of the poet's temperament create much of the material which feeds his work, because he illustrates the conflict in terms of the struggles which he observes, objectively, in the world outside himself. In spite of his detachment, he has to exercise his highly sharpened consciousness. Robert Graves has not been an exception. In the following concluding passage of his Preface, he shows how he acknowledges these two manifestations of temporary dependence.

> That the proportion of what would be called 'unpleasant poems' is so high in this twenty-three year sequence surprised me on first looking it over. But I see this now not as a furious reaction against the anodynic tradition of poetry in which I was educated but as the blurted confession of a naturally sanguine temperament: that the age

into which I was born, in spite of its enjoyable lavishness of entertainment, has been intellectually and morally in perfect confusion. To manifest poetic faith by a close and energetic study of the disgusting, the contemptible and the evil is not very far in the direction of poetic serenity, but it has been the behaviour most natural to a man of my physical and literary inheritances. Other steps remain, and a few have already been taken. I should say that my health as a poet lies in my mistrust of the comfortable point-of-rest. Certainly, this suspicious habit, this dwelling upon discomfort and terror, has brought me good luck: for in the midst of my obstinate stumblings there have come sudden flashes of grace and knowledge—

> As to the common brute it falls
> To see real miracles
> And howl with irksome joy.

I have to thank Laura Riding for her constructive and detailed criticism of my poems in various stages of composition—a generosity from which so many contemporary poets besides myself have benefited.

That passage, generous in its candour, offers many points for critical speculation. It contains the whole argument upon which the later comers, to whom I have already referred, have based their poetry and its political affiliations. It reveals how fully aware this poet is of his own disposition. It defines the history of his fight and emancipation, and hints at the truth that indeed, poetry in its essence is always a demonstration of personal growth, of hope either furthered or frustrated, and is therefore "the blurted confession of a naturally sanguine temperament" as distinct from the guile and cynicism of the man of the world.

Finally, and here it touches upon the qualities which make Robert Graves distinctive, it describes his self-immolatory nature, his determination to put away this native independence and detachment, and to take a god here, and another there, who shall demand from him a discipline of "suspicious habit, and dwelling upon discomfort and terror" which in the end shall be a hair-garment means towards salvation through "grace and knowledge." I believe it is a gesture indicative of greatness; of that purity of spirit without which no lasting poetry is written.

I would emphasize that it is not this discipline which makes him unique. For all poets must have a hero, a mentor; possibly to do their thinking for them, while they are concerned with the agony of translating that thought into the words which shall be more sensuous than flesh and more mysterious than blood. In the history of poets' lives and inspiration, we see the most incongruous loyalties of this kind; Dante walking between Aquinas and Virgil, Shelley between Plato and

William Godwin, Yeats between Madame Blavatsky and any old Celtic guy. In the course of his revelations, Robert Graves is explicit upon his particular loyalties; and in his last one, the one which he claims to have set him on the road at last to a right self-knowledge and a right and healthy relationship with human society, he has expressed himself in some of the most original and beautiful of his verse. In the poem *To Whom Else?* for example, he salutes his "sovereign muse" as patently as any old-fashioned love poet.

To whom else other than,
To whom else not of man
Yet in human state,
Standing neither in stead
Of self nor idle godhead,
Should I, man in man bounded,
Myself dedicate?
To whom else momently,
To whom else endlessly,
But to you, I?
To you who only,
To you who mercilessly,
To you who lovingly,
Plucked out the lie?
To whom else less acquaint,
To whom else without taint
Of death, death-true?
With great astonishment
Thankfully I consent
To my estrangement
From me in you.

That is an odd piece; but its full meaning is rich and various. This "plucking out of the lie," this "consent to estrangement"; these are experiences that reach down to the deeps of this poet's nature, a process that tortures him, that turns his past into a new-living present with a double agony. In a group of fourteen such poems, whose technical affiliations are deliberate in subservience as the poet humbles himself in this dreadful devotion, he pays tribute. He describes his old literary comradeships with fellow writers, his wartime memories, prides, horrors, and ambitions.

This was to praise ourselves, rebuke ourselves
How we sufficed, fell short, exceeded
In days before you came, you first,
Who plucked the speech-thread from a jargon-tangled
Fleece of a thousand tongues, wills, voices,
To be a single speech, twisted fine;
Snapping it short like Fate then—
'Thus much, no more—'

And we confessed that since you came
We might no longer feign and stutter
As poets of the passionate chance,
Nor claim the indulgence of the hour.
Our tongues must prompter be than those
That wag with modish lamentation—
Or lost men, otherwise, and renegades
To our confession, maudlin-sane must die
Suicides on the stair of yesterday.

Mr. Graves's development as a poet has been littered with his suicides. From each he has sprung to a new life—but the same poet has survived!

Who is that poet? What is he? I have called him a traveller in the desert, because I have seen his progress as a painful, thirsty one, in which he struggles from one influence, one oasis, to another, remaining with each until his thirst is quenched and his strength restored, and then driving on again with his own obstinate daemon for camel.

It is in these periods of solitary progress that he speaks most authentically, and reveals the nature which no influence can change. It is one beset by fear, in the same way that a child is, or that Blake was. Huge powers of good and evil come at his imagination. Many of his poems are simple articulations of this terror. Here is an instance. But notice how skilfully it is clothed; how the repetition is drummed in with an effect like that of African drums.

Nobody, ancient mischief, nobody,
Harasses always with an absent body.
Nobody coming up the road, nobody,
Like a tall man in a dark cloak, nobody.
Nobody about the house, nobody,
Like children creeping up the stairs, nobody.
Nobody anywhere in the garden, nobody,
Like a young girl quiet with needlework, nobody.
Nobody coming, nobody, not yet here,
Incessantly welcomed by the wakeful ear.
Until this nobody shall consent to die
Under his curse must every man lie—
The curse of his jealousy, of his grief and fright,
Of sudden rape and murder screamed in the night.

It is the drive of this primitive fear that has furthered his experiments in technique. Nothing is so reassuring to a frightened man as a bag of tools. It gives him the assurance that he will be able to get out of any predicament into which the mystery of the future may slam him, with a groaning of locks. It fortifies the poet, who is always, waking and sleep-

ing, driven by this obsession, always possessed of this *dernière innocence et dernière timidité* as Arthur Rimbaud described it in his *Saison en Enfer*. This tension between innocence and timidity can be recognized at once as Mr. Graves's "blurted confession of a naturally sanguine temperament."

Every poet comes to it at some period in his life; and usually it comes during those mysterious decades, the thirties and forties, when youth is dying, and the full, authoritative man is being born as a result of that youth's self-squanderings upon the lovely body of life itself, the ever-feminine power of experience. The more violent this death, the more agonizing this re-birth, the firmer is the poet's technique, and the more personal and original his idiom. Mr. Graves's work proves this relationship. So quick, so highly nervous has been his sensibility, that his work seemed from the beginning to foreshadow the later experiences of his life. It was as though the poet made the man, while the man was making the poet; a paradoxical reciprocity. Look, for example, at this early poem, *Lost Love*. Note the already close, hard imagery, and compare this with the more symbolical imagery of his later poems. Except for the ripened scope of the images in the later work, their angle of vision is the same, and their manner of employment identical; another proof that the poet, in spite of his changes of theory, and his several monitors, has remained true to himself.

His eyes are quicked so with grief,
He can watch a grass or leaf
Every instant grow; he can
Clearly through a flint wall see,
Or watch the startled spirit flee
From the throat of a dead man.
    Across two counties he can hear
And catch your words before you speak.
The woodlouse or the maggot's weak
Clamour rings in his sad ear,
And noise so slight it would surpass
Credence—drinking sound of grass,
Worm talk, clashing jaws of moth
Chumbling holes in cloth;
The groan of ants who undertake
Gigantic loads for honour's sake
(Their sinews creak, their breath comes thin);
Whir of spiders when they spin,
And minute whispering, mumbling, sighs
Of idle grubs and butterflies.
    This man is quickened so with grief,
He wanders god-like or like thief

Inside and out, below, above,
Without relief seeking lost love.

But the process of enriching those images with a fuller symbolism has been one of agony and a suffering that has driven this poet mercilessly, on the one hand to a ceaseless self-examination, and on the other to sharper and sharper experiment in his medium of verse-forms. Striving to recognize his own symptoms, he has gathered into his imagination a store of historical pryings that have overflowed into his prose work, notably the two *Claudius* tales. But he has not found an explanation in the past. He has turned to the contemporary scene, experimenting as Mr. Eliot has done, in the reaction from the sordid, non-significant details outside the backdoor of civilization. He finds in everyday actuality a hell presided over by a devil who

. . . . leads the sick words into parliament
To rule a dustbin world with deep-sleep phrases.

Amongst those reactions is the mood of satire, in which he uses his wit with a penetrating relentlessness to further mental and spiritual enquiry, so that every gust of his laughter is a most pertinent question, pressing home the problem until it becomes a fresh torture, and another range of self-discipline and self-discovery. No matter how he may dramatize that process, it remains to torment him.

To the galleys, thief, and sweat your soul out
With strong tugging under the curled whips,
That there your thievishness may find full play.
Whereas, before, you stole rings, flowers and watches,
Oaths, jests and proverbs,
Yet paid for bed and board like an honest man,
This shall be entire thiefdom: you shall steal
Sleep from chain-galling, diet from sour crusts,
Comradeship from the damned, the ten-year-chained—
And, more than this, the excuse for life itself
From a boat steered toward battles not your own.

A poet who can promise himself such a life as that is one prepared to make the final renunciation, in order that his work may be purged of dross, and burned down to a bone-clean simplicity. That is what Mr. Graves claims to have done, and I think that his poetry will remain for Time to justify that claim.

(With this essay Mr. Richard Church brings his appreciations of modern poets to an end. The essays will be published shortly in book form.)

IF QUEEN VICTORIA—?

An historical phantasy

By Sir J. A. R. Marriott

OF the few diversions enjoyed by the historian the most fascinating is speculation about the "might-have-beens." Nor is it perhaps the least suggestive and instructive. What might have been the effect upon the religious history of the modern world had Erasmus prevailed against Luther and Calvin, or had John Colet instead of the Council of Trent been charged with the re-definition of Catholic doctrine and discipline? What might have been the fate of Parliamentary Government had John Pym not been too quick—it was hardly more than a matter of minutes—for Lord Strafford? What would have happened in America could Howe and Washington have interchanged commands in 1776-7? What would have happened to England if Canning and Castlereagh had not forestalled the action of Napoleon at Copenhagen, or if Nelson had not, in the nick of time, discovered his mistake in following Villeneuve to the West Indies? What would have happened to Germany had a son, instead of a daughter, been born to the Duke and Duchess of Kent—had, in fine, Queen Victoria been a man? The game might be carried as much further as the players please, or their ingenuity permits.

The answer to the last question seems to have a direct bearing upon the contemporary situation in Europe, and may even be suggestive in regard to the post-war settlement in Germany. It may, therefore, be worth while to carry the investigation further.

Had a King, instead of a Queen, succeeded William IV in 1837, he would have been king not only of Great Britain and Ireland, but also of Hanover. The union between England and Hanover was never, indeed, organic. Originating in 1714 it had always been in the technical sense merely "personal"; but, even so, Prussia might have hesitated to annex Hanover in 1866 had the "personal union" with England still survived.

Had Prussia not incorporated Hanover, her Rhine Province would have remained disjoined from Brandenburg; Bismarck might not then have been able to go as far as he did in the Prussianization of Germany, nor might Hitler have been able to complete Bismarck's work in Germany, still less to make himself master (even temporarily) of continental Europe.

Lest all this speculation should seem too fantastic, even as an historical diversion, we must go back a long way to note the successive stages by which Prussia, with only a few setbacks in its progress, has attained its present position.

In the fifteenth century we see a Frederick of Hohenzollern for the first time established in the barren mark of Brandenburg as its first Elector (1415). Five years earlier the Teutonic Knights, who in the 13th century had conquered, colonized and Christianized Prussia, had been defeated by the Poles on the field—some day to become historic—of Tannenberg. As a result the Knights, though retaining East Prussia, lost West Prussia to Poland. After the dissolution of their Order (1525) their last High Master, who happened to be a Hohenzollern, became the first hereditary duke of East Prussia though still holding the Duchy in fief of Poland.

On the extinction of the male line of the Prussian Hohenzollern (1618) the Duchy passed to a kinsman, the Elector of Brandenburg. The union of Brandenburg and East Prussia was the first step towards the creation of the modern Kingdom of Prussia.

The next was taken by Frederick William, just designated the "Great Elector." At the close of the Thirty Years War (1648), so disastrous to Germany as a whole, this astute Hohenzollern managed to absorb the valuable episcopal States of Halberstadt, Minden, Kammin and part of Magdeburg. This was the first move towards the West. This important territorial acquisition did not exhaust Prussia's debt to its Great Elector. He it was who first organized the Civil Service to whose efficiency Prussia has owed so much; who established a large standing army and devised the financial system necessary to maintain it; who developed to the full the resources of a poor country; above all, who was wise enough to welcome to Brandenburg 20,000 French Huguenots. Amply they repaid the debt they owed him. They rebuilt his capital; they taught his backward subjects the industrial arts in which they were adepts and introduced into the social life of their adopted country a strain of the culture it sorely needed. In more senses than one, Brandenburg-Prussia was moving Westwards.

The next Elector obtained from the Emperor a Royal Crown and took his place in history as the first King of Prussia. The main work of the second King—the object of Carlyle's bitter sarcasm—was to bequeath a large and well trained army and a full treasury to his son, Frederick the Great. Both bequests Frederick put to the fullest use. They enabled him to snatch the strategically important Duchy of Silesia from Maria Theresa (1740); to forestall Hanover in the acquisition of East Friesland, with its valuable port of Emden (1740) and from the loot obtained in the first Partition of Poland (1772) to link up Brandenburg with East Prussia by the acquisition of West Prussia. The great prize of Danzig was, indeed, denied to him. But only for the moment. With another great fortress Thorn, Danzig, together with the whole of "Great Poland" formed the Prussian share in the second Partition of Poland (1793). Two years later the last act in the tragedy was played and Prussia got a large share—including Warsaw—when Poland was wholly erased from the map of Europe (1797).

Then came the Napoleonic Wars. After concluding the Treaty of Basle with the French Republic in 1795 Prussia managed, not indeed without ignominy, to keep out of the fray for ten years. But Napoleon's first move after the renewal of his war with England in 1803 closely concerned Prussia. It was directed against Hanover, the neutrality of which, despite its union with a belligerent had hitherto been respected by Napoleon, though Frederick William III of Prussia had occupied it for six months in 1801 when he adhered to the armed neutrality of the Northern Powers. But in 1805 he had no mind for war with England any more than with Napoleon who, by pressing Hanover upon him, was anxious to force him to fight England.

At last, however, impelled to action by Napoleon's insolence, Frederick William declared war (October 1, 1806), only to suffer crushing defeats within three weeks at Jena and Aúerstädt. Berlin was occupied by Napoleon, and, by the Treaty of Tilsit, Prussia, saved by complete annihilation only by the intervention of the Czar Alexander, was stripped of all her acquisitions west of the Elbe as well as all that she had stolen from Poland (1807).

Tilsit marked for Prussia the nadir of degradation but also the beginning of rejuvenation. The completeness of her recovery was manifest when in 1813 Prussia led Germany into

the War of Liberation and played a leading part in the overthrow of Napoleon in 1813-5.

Prussia had a claim to some share in the redistribution of territory at the Peace. In what direction did she look for it? Blind to her ultimate destiny she looked not westwards but eastwards and southwards. Eastwards she regained the great fortresses of Danzig and Thorn, together with the Province of Posen, lying between the Oder and the Vistula and connecting East Prussia with Silesia. But the bulk of Poland went to Russia. Prussia having lost most of her share of Poland and having given up Anspach and Bayreuth to Bavaria, and East Friesland and Hildesheim to Hanover, looked for compensation elsewhere. She wanted Saxony, but ultimately got only the northern and smaller half of it. Her most important acquisition was the great province on both sides of the Rhine and including Cleves (Prussian since 1648) and Westphalia, Köln, Aachen, Bonn, Coblenz and Trier as well. Geographically, economically, culturally, and strategically this acquisition was immensely significant. It marked indeed the turning point in the history of Prussia. But its true significance was not at the time perceived either by a rather dissatisfied beneficiary or by the Allies. Their sole preoccupation was with France, and they congratulated themselves that possession of the Rhine Province would throw on Prussia the main burden of defence against France, not appreciating that it would at the same time make Prussia the guardian, protector, and ultimately the master of Germany. Besides, was not the value to Prussia of the Rhine Province discounted by the fact that she was cut off from it by the intervening territories of Hanover and Hesse?

1866 was not foreseen in 1815. But to that crucial year we must rapidly pass. Much had, indeed, happened in the meantime which must not now detain us.* The failure of the Frankfort Parliament (1848) had taught Bismarck several disastrous lessons: that there was no hope of a united Germany until the 'ramshackle' Habsburg Empire was expelled from it; that only by Prussia could Germany be made; and that Prussia must remake it not by chatter in Parliament but by "blood and iron."

Bismarck's first move was the seizure (in conjunction with Austria) of Schleswig and Holstein. By that *coup* Bismarck got Kiel, and the chance of creating a Prussian navy; it enabled him to fix a quarrel upon Austria, and it taught him that he had

*The story of these important years may be read in *The Evolution of Prussia* by J. A. R. Marriott and C. G. Robertson (4th Ed. Oxford 1938) c's ix, x, xi.

nothing to fear from England, nor (at the moment) from France which with England had guaranteed the "integrity" of Denmark and its Duchies. Lord John Russell might be trusted to content himself with addressing admirable homilies to Continental sinners;* Napoleon III (as Bismarck learnt at Biarritz in 1865) could be bribed by half-promises which Bismarck had no intention of fulfilling.

So the stage was set for the decisive conflict between Prussia and Austria, pending ever since Frederick the Great seized Silesia in 1740. Threatened by Bismarck's conduct in Schleswig-Holstein, Austria appealed to the Germanic Bund, of which she was President. The Bund agreed to mobilize the federal army against Prussia. Prussia thereupon withdrew from the Bund and declared war (June 15, 1866) upon Hanover, Hesse and Saxony, and (June 18) upon the other members of the Bund, including Austria.

Within six weeks the whole of Germany, including Austria lay prostrate under the heel of Prussia. Austria was turned out of Germany and Italy; the old Bund was dissolved; all the States north of the Main were to form a North German Confederation under the presidency of Prussia; the Danish Duchies, the Free City of Frankfort-on-the-Main, Nassau, Hesse and Hanover were absorbed into Prussia.

This brings us back, after a long detour, to the point from which we started. Could Bismarck have wrought his will so easily in 1866 if Queen Victoria (to use an Irishism) had been King of Hanover? That she never forgave Bismarck for his conduct in 1863-66 is true, but is not strictly relevant. The question proposed remains. If it be answered in the negative, Hanover, still joined in personal union with Great Britain, might well have marred Bismarck's plan for a German Empire under the Hohenzollern King of Prussia in 1871.

Hitler improved upon Bismarck. The erection of the German Reich of 1871 carried the unification of Germany a long way, but it was still short of complete Prussianization. The *Bundesrat*† which represented the component *States* of the Empire, exercised very important functions. Under the *Enabling Act* of 1933 the States themselves, reduced to *Lände* under the Weimar Constitution, were put under Germans responsible only to the Reich; the Provincial Diets were

*See Marriott: *Second Chambers* c. vi.

†An instance of Bismarck's superb effrontery will be found in his Note to Great Britain (*Parl. Papers 1864 Denmark and Germany III 639*). Mowat: *Select Treaties* p. 70.

abolished: Germany, for the first time in its history, was completely unified.

Again we must press the question (somewhat amended after the death of Queen Victoria). Would the harmony of Hitler's plan for Germany have been destroyed if King George V had been still on the throne of Hanover? After the events of 1918 the question, always speculative, had become fantastic, but for the purposes of the present speculation it may be permitted, and may give rise to still further speculations. If in 1933, England, in the interests of the King of Hanover, had resisted the encroachments of Hitler, would the British Government have had the support of all classes of the English people and of the British Empire? Would the British 'democracies' in the Homeland and in the Dominions—democracies, not yet aware of the implications of Nazism—have supported the Imperial Government in a war against Germany? Is it likely that we should have gone into the fight with the same degree of enthusiasm and unity, as was manifested in 1939, when Nazism stood revealed to the world in all its frightfulness? On the other hand Herr Hitler, not as yet quite firmly seated in the saddle, might in 1933, have hesitated to raise the issue and risk war against a Hanover, so closely united with Great Britain.

If Herr Hitler had hesitated would Japan have ventured to flout the League of Nations by persisting in its aggression against China, or Signor Mussolini have, also in defiance of the League, attacked Abyssinia?

But the temptation to extend the area of speculation must at some point be resisted. The point seems to have been reached! Yet one further observation is strictly relevant to the original enquiry.

Among the many plans* which have lately been put forward by anti-Nazi Germans—no longer resident in Germany—for the reconstruction of their country, as soon as the present tyranny shall be overpast, one or two pay special attention to the place which Hanover may occupy in the new Germany. They assume that Prussia, recognized by them as the *fons et origo* of the policy which for eighty years has troubled the peace of Europe, must not be allowed to occupy a position which has enabled her to do so. Prussia should, as some suggest, be excluded from Germany, as she herself excluded Austria in 1866; or, if (as others would prefer) *within* the German Reich,

*Some of these plans I discussed in *The Quarterly Review*, No. 547, January 1941.

must no longer exercise hegemony over it, but must take its place, perhaps reduced to the limits of 1860, or even of 1770, as one of the component States of a reconstituted Germany. Dr. Sebastian Haffner, for instance, whose recent book *Germany, Jekyll and Hyde*, won such warm commendation from Mr. Wickham Steed in a recent number of this Review,* stated that conclusion without periphrasis. He wrote:

> The Germans feel an inescapable doom hanging over them, a magic spell . . . . Nevertheless, if a real peace is possible the peace must be broken, which means: the German Reich must disappear, and the last seventy-five years of German history must be erased. The Germans must retrace their steps to the point where they took the wrong path—to the year 1866. No peace is conceivable with the Prussian Reich which was born at that time, and whose last logical expression is no other than Nazi Germany. And no vital "other" Germany is anywhere to be found but that which in that year was worsted by the caprice of war without ever totally succumbing.

Further, Dr. Haffner believes that Hanover would welcome the restoration of its monarchy (presumably disjoined from that of England) and might form the nucleus of a sort of federal union embracing also the kingdom of Saxony, Thuringia, the Grand Duchies of Oldenburg, Lippe, Mecklenburg and Brunswick as well as Schleswig-Holstein and the Free Hanseatic Republic. How far the region thus defined has, as Dr. Haffner claims, a cultural and commercial individuality of its own quite distinct from that of its Western and Eastern German neighbours, I am not competent to say; but the suggestion cannot fail to interest anyone who has perused the preceding pages of this article.

The article has been written avowedly as a diversion—an historical phantasy, but in these serious days it would not have been written, had the facts it outlines not seemed, in view of future eventualities, worth recording. *Dulce est desipere in loco.* Shakespeare and Scott have taught us that sound sense comes as often from the wearer of motley as from the reputed sage.

*"The Need for a Policy." THE FORTNIGHTLY, July, 1940.

EBB AND FLOW

By Stephen Gwynn

THE Libyan adventure has evidently reached full flood; and now, when these lines are written, we are left guessing where precisely the next effort must be made. Beyond all doubt the fighting in the Balkans, hitherto disastrous for Italy, is going to spread. Hitler's move, first into Hungary, then into Rumania and now finally into Bulgaria has disclosed increasingly its military character; and yet not a shot has been fired. If this so economical process of conquest could be extended to Yugoslavia and to Greece, all would have gone perfectly from the German standpoint. This however cannot be hoped for; Greece is in no mood to submit, and Greece has an ally at hand, whom the Axis has not found negligible. General Wavell has shown little disposition to wait upon the convenience of his opponents; and by moving to within striking distance of a sea which they do not control, the Germans have placed themselves so as to be a much better target for the British than the British are for them. It is true they can strike at Greece, and whoever strikes Greece strikes England; an honourable nation can never be indifferent to the fate of its allies, but when there is one active ally only, and that ally has brought to the common cause prestige of splendid and unlooked for triumphs, no effort and no sacrifice must be spared for the joint defence. Greece can no more be kept clear of danger from German attack than the City of London or Buckingham Palace; but it may well be possible to keep the Germans at a distance from Greece and make them pay dear for every attempt to shorten it. Military counterstrokes may come before the diplomatic thrust has shed its outward character of peacefulness.

What Next?

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But instructed speculation may be mischievous, and the uninstructed variety is futile; what one can note is that people here await events with confidence, after the events of the past nine months. Colonel Wedgwood, expresses the mood of the time by saying that he is "not ashamed of the country, or of the Parliament or of himself." Very satisfying it is to me that this particular member of Parliament should be in that frame of

Confidence

mind; he is not easily contented where honour is concerned. I was much cheered too by recent utterances of another man whom also I knew long ago at Westminster. Mr. Lees Smith is now chairman of the Labour Party and has the right to speak for it—which means that Labour as a political organization has ceased to be "class conscious," and that is a thing to thank God for. Here is an Englishman of the most cultured kind, son (as the ordinary authority informs me) of a gunner colonel and originally headed for his father's profession. He entered Woolwich, but while he was still a cadet, some change of mind altered his course; he went to Oxford and became associated with Ruskin College and presumably with the sort of socialism that William Morris stood for. From 1910 to 1918 he sat in Parliament as a Liberal—one of the intelligentzia rather than of the politicians. But unless my memory is altogether at fault he did one unusual thing, by entering the army in the ranks. It was after the war that he joined the Labour Party and brought to it a highly trained knowledge of economics. Office came to him in the Labour administration of 1929-31. But first and last, if he belonged to any class, it was to that in which he was born and bred. British Labour to-day is willing to accept as its official leader an Englishman who shares and can expound the views that British Labour stands for. It was good to hear this an academically trained man—part of whose academic training had been military—insisting with perfect justice that the workmen who made the British tanks were among the victors of Libya.

It seems that the same is true of aircraft: British workmanship stands up to all tests. But there probably was never a time in British history when workmen were so conscious of their partnership in the work for which the machines of war are made. That is the British way of being totalitarian, and it has the advantage over Hitler's which individual handiwork has over mass production. Very wisely, Mr. Lees Smith talking to his countrymen, so to say from the chair of the Labour Party, dealt as frankly as even Mr. Churchill might have done. He told them that in his judgment a year must go by before British equipment could surpass that of the Germans, and that till the weight of armament was on their side, nothing could save England, and the world, but the staying power of the British. Lord Lothian, another academically trained politician, in the last great speech which he delivered in America said "If you give your help, I can promise you that you won't be backing a quitter." Academic or not, such men know how

to speak to the English and for the English. But Mr. Lees Smith drove home his moral by telling that far-flung audience of the B.B.C. what it must be to be conquered by Germany. He told them the facts—or some of the facts—about Poland. Centuries must have passed since such brutalities were perpetrated by one Europeon nation on another. And all Germany is responsible, for all Germany accepts whatever profits there are.

* * * * *

France Co-operates

France is not so treated, nor Belgium—the French in particular find themselves used with a certain consideration; for after all, much may be hoped, by Germans, from a democratic nation which put M. Laval into power. And the Germans, like all other continental Europeans, feel the prestige of France. To get France on their side in the struggle against democracy would be triumph indeed. Only a fool would disparage Germany's achievements, but they culminate in a power to substitute for what is desirable something that will do; it is the home of the *ersatz;* whereas France accepts and perfects her natural excellencies in wine, oil, butter—and intelligence. Mr. Ford is a great figure in the motor making world, but if Mr. Ford were a German in his dealings with trade he would ardently desire to annex Rolls-Royce. We cannot deny but that Hitler has made some headway; Marshal Pétain repeatedly expresses his willingness to "co-operate." Not indeed to the full extent; not to be an active ally against his former allies; yet to co-operate with the power that has France under its booted heel. The truth is that this great Frenchman has lost his faith in France; he is one of those capable of holding that her misfortunes are her proper chastisement. He would say to her (I quote once more from Henri Franck's *La Danse devant l'Arche*).

> Que le génie civique au bonnet phrygien
> Qui conduisit longtemps ton peuple à la victoire
> Lui a fait boire un vin de mensonge et d'erreur;
> Quil faudra t'infliger penitence publique,
> Pieds nus, et à genoux au parvis Notre-Dame
> Confesser tes folies, tes fautes, tes erreurs,
> Comme une fille sâoule, une folle ribaude.

However, it may be that Marshal Pétain has overestimated his own powers of acceptance; to "co-operate" even with M. Laval appears to have been more than he could endure for a continuance. Meanwhile from the Sahara comes news of a

triumph for the Free French who, striking across five hundred miles of desert which separated them from their objective have captured the oasis of Kufra. Another body of them, despatched from Britain, are now part of the forces harrying the Italian colony of Eritrea; they know that they carry the honour of France and it will be strange if they do not send tidings that will put heart into their downcast country.

These signs appear of immense importance to such of us as hold that the defeat of Germany can only be achieved through a general rising of the peoples that Germany holds in subjection. If Great Britain makes that rising possible, her heaviest task is done; she will have enabled Europe to bring about its own salvation: and the strongest power in a military sense to be liberated is that of France, but another aspect of the future must be borne in mind. Well meaning gentlemen and ladies propose that the British should outline their ideas for a future settlement of Europe. They do not realize how little authority any such proposals would have unless they were backed by France. Great Britain has always tended to regard itself as standing outside the continent—and has been so regarded. Paris, not London, has been Europe's metropolis. Even with America added, no project coming directly from the Anglo-Saxon world could be regarded as acceptable; any settlement arrived at in Europe to bind Europe must be not merely accepted by France; it must bear the imprint of the French mind. What must not be allowed to happen again is that so excessive a share in the risk and burden of supporting it should be imposed on the French.

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U.S. Africa

One of the numberless matters in which French co-operation and guidance is necessary for any durable post-war settlement will be the problems of Africa. General Smuts, no negligible person, has put forward as a possible goal the United States of Africa—in which South Africa would be called to play a leading part. The Journal of the African Society which quotes him does not take note of another utterance in which he clearly indicated a desire, or an intention (with such a man they are hardly distinguishable) to get rid altogether of the Italians as holders of African territory. That, in view of the present position, looks like being possible. But France remains enormously important in this relation, and it is precisely in Africa that Free France has been able to assert itself. Now on a great range of subjects French methods of dealing with African problems are hardly

reconcilable with those pursued in the Union of South Africa. On others—such as the vital matter of which must be dealt with unless the Sahara is to spread over the whole continent—there should be no serious difficulty of co-operation, while on the other hand an organization embracing the whole continent would make active measures possible. But the project calls up a whole jungle of obstacles. Nevertheless it is worth noting that General Smuts has suggested it, at a time when white South Africans, coloured South Africans, native Africans, from the East Coast and native Africans from the West Coast are fighting in one army, which has amongst other purposes that of restoring freedom to an ancient Christian state of Africa. Up to the present the great tract of territory which France governs on French ideas, in North and West and Central Africa is for the most part outside the mêlée. How long it will be allowed or constrained to stay so is one of the questions which time only can answer. But one thing is certain. Native Africa will not come in on the side of Nazis who proclaim that the African is little better than an Ape. French authorities have very carefully distributed the relevant passages from Hitler's book.

* * * * *

Military Authors

General Wavell's lectures in their book form have had a vogue due in part no doubt to curiosity about so successful a commander but also to a very engaging literary quality. They had personality and the personality had charm. I do not know that they expressed anything which was not the common teaching of the British army; but they achieved what was one of the most difficult things in literature, *proprie communia dicere*, to utter a truth of general acceptance and yet give it the stamp of your own mintage. They had urbanity and that perfect breeding which is characteristic of the British professional soldier at his best. Curiously enough, the British soldiers whose writings I have most admired were not in this way typical; Sir William Napier had command of nearly all the literary qualities except the fluent ease. Sir William Butler had a stately eloquence which fitted with the figure of that tall Tipperary man, but there was always a touch of rhetoric—to which the typical British officer is disinclined. Not a trace of it in General Wavell, and yet he becomes known to us as the commanders in the last war were not known. Haig, as he admits, lacked that power to convey his personality which is highly desirable in a commander; and if General

Plumer had it, I think only the officers who were in direct contact with him felt the emanation. Allenby perhaps alone managed to get through. At all events it is matter for rejoicing that the leader to whose directing genius we have owed so much in these last months is no mere name to us. And in the light of his doctrine, we can see how admirably the principle of leaving a free hand to subordinates in execution of detail has been carried out; he helps us to understand and feel the merit of General Maitland Wilson, General O'Connor and the rest to whose ability official recognition has been given by decorations which the public applauds. If we can applaud more intelligently since these lectures were published, we owe that and are glad to owe it to Sir Archibald Wavell's singular talent for agreeable and clear exposition. *The Times* did a real service when it brought this talent, which was known only to soldiers, into the public domain.

* * * * *

While America acts at the pace proper to unhurried democracy, it seems that it feels tumultuously. I quote from a poem " For the Royal Air Force " by Mrs. Anne Page Johns, which has been sent to me

> You were the children of an easeful time
> Unmindful of old nobleness (we thought),
> Heedless inheritors of a softer clime
> Than heroes knew—safe-convoyed fledgelings taught
> Synthetic hardness, goaded warily
> With sportsman toys in steeped security.
> —O fierce-flown challengers.

I like that last phrase. Well, if America thought that, it has got a shock—but not so unpleasant as came to Germany, who really did think it. And Italy. We shall soon be saying " poor Italy ! "

THE UKRAINE

By W. E. D. ALLEN

"A colosseum of facts and data about that borderland of the realm of Muscovy which we now speak of as Ukraine. The book is immensely detailed, recondite yet readable, and well supplied with maps, and bibliographical notes."
Manchester Guardian.

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CORRESPONDENCE

Propaganda Technique

To the Editor of The Fortnightly.

Dear Sir,

Your two contributors Mr. Melville and Mr. (Cadet) Marshall write separate articles in your March issue which might profitably be considered together. Mr. Marshall writes that " a combination of statistical ' dips ' and observed reports is capable of re-establishing contact between rulers and ruled . . ." Mr. Melville concludes that " now is the time to make preparations for equipping ourselves for that final victory in the realm of ideas which must accompany our final victory on the field of battle."

May I suggest that Mr. Marshall's ' dips ' and observed reports are the material with which Mr. Melville should be equipped for his propaganda battle? Without these Mr. Melville's propaganda would flounder—by, to quote Mr. Marshall again, " generalizing from casual contacts (the Common People—the taxi-driver, the barman, the gardener and the waiter in the Club) like an opportunist professing to be able to walk across ice floes and map them out at the same time."

Both these contributors curiously enough scorn the advertising firm. Mr. Melville's most able critique of British propaganda seems to have failed to detect any resemblance between the principles of commercial and political propaganda, while Mr. Marshall merely regrets that advertising first discovered the Gallup method of public reconnaissance.

Why this regret? Why not let us admit that we don't like advertising men, propagandists or mass observationists either, but that they are, potentially, at least, a most necessary part of the democratic social order?

For my part—having spent some three years on just such work in America, and having been thrown out, at the back

door, of more than one Chicago household—I hate advertising and the things it requires you to do, but realize, nevertheless, that it is an efficient and essential part of our commercial system.

It is to be hoped that the excellent suggestions put forward by your contributors will, in due course, become operative either during this war or in the future democratic world order. Meanwhile, in the matter of our propaganda technique we still have a lot to learn from the American, the German, yes, and even the British methods of commercial propaganda.

Yours faithfully,
MAURICE KEATING.

44, Chancery Lane,
London, W.C.2.

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A SENSE OF DESPAIR

By E. Muller-Sturmheim

BLACK RECORD, by Sir Robert Vansittart. *Hamish Hamilton.* 6*d.*

Reading Sir Robert Vansittart's *Black Record* I was seized with the same sense of despair as evoked by Nietzsche's *Ecce Homo.* "They (the Germans) have on their conscience all the crimes committed against civilization in the last four hundred years," wrote Nietzsche, creator of the concept of the Blonde Beast. Sir Robert's pamphlet also reminded me of the following words of Schopenhauer: "Should I die unexpectedly and should there be any puzzlement as to my political testament, I say that I am ashamed of being a German and know myself to be at one in this with all the really great men whom fate placed among this people." Sir Robert's dictum, "Germans in the plural are the Brazen Horde" strikes me almost as a translation of Goethe's words, "The German people are so worthy of respect individually, and so wretched as a whole."

If the greatest Germans speak thus contemptuously of the German people, if, as Sir Robert holds, the Germans have not changed since the time of Tacitus, then we have every reason for despair, despite Sir Robert's assurance "that nothing is impossible in history and the soul of a people *can* be changed. Why not Germany?"

The problem represented by the German people is insoluble, unless we draw a clear distinction between them and the Nazis. (Incidentally, it is a great favour to the Nazis to identify them with the German people.) However, a very careful reading of Sir Robert's indictment shows that he does draw a distinction between Nazis and Germans. His attack is directed above all against the Nazis. ("Nazism is a fundamental fraud. A Nazi is congenitally incapable of peace. To compare Nazi Germany to the Middle Ages is an insult to the Middle Ages . . . the Nazi Government is anti-Christian . . . all the Nazi leaders who have not only no religion but no morals . . . There is hardly a single professional Nazi with a clean pair of hands.") I could quote many other similar passages and they leave no doubt that the Nazis are the principal objective of his attack. Rightly so. For if the German people as a whole were sick through and through, they could never recover, and Sir Robert believes in their recovery, and that within the comparatively short period of from one to two generations.

If every word of the Nazis against Britain is dictated by a base and bestial

hatred, every line of Sir Robert's is inspired by righteous anger that the eternally sacred values of humanity should be repeatedly menaced by a misguided German nation. His indictment is directed against the kind of leadership which the German people have always accepted. (" . . . then and now the German working man had no say in his own fate : he was just cannon-fodder and factory fuel). Not that the German people can be completely absolved for having allowed the Nazis to commit in its name and with its aid, crimes that have shocked and revolted every civilized soul. The Nazis have disgraced the German name more than anyone before them. Yet the Germans accuse the whole world, and the words addressed by Solon to the Athenians when they had fallen under the sway of the tyrants might fairly be addressed to them :

> If you tolerate evil and misery through despondency
> Do not lay the blame on angry gods,
> You yourselves gave the tyrants power and a strong defence,
> Thereby purchasing shameful servitude.

This servitude of the Germans went so far that the Nazis could dare to unleash a new world war. The guilt of the German people is great, very great. It is therefore not at all surprising that many people in their anger have grown tired of differentiating between Nazi and Non-Nazi Germans. But let us remember the words of Seneca, the stoic, the Emperor Nero's unhappy tutor : " If you want a sage to be angry according to the baseness of shameful deeds, then he will have to be not angry but mad." Indeed, the shameful deeds of the Nazis could easily drive one mad ; but that is precisely what we must guard against. It was also Seneca who said : " One may blame two, ten or even a million of people but we must forgive the whole of humanity." It will not be easy to forgive the whole German people, but despite all our anger over the misdeeds of the Nazis we must not forget the one great goal, which consists in liberating the German people from their criminal leaders and preparing them spiritually and morally for a new and better future in the world.

THE UKRAINE : A History, by W. E. D. Allen. *Cambridge University Press.* 21*s.*

If the Poles have good reasons to blame their misfortunes on their geographical position, how much more so the Ukrainians ! There is hardly a page in Mr. Allen's book that does not mention either the Tartars in the East, or the Turks in the South, or the Poles in the West and the Russians in the North, with an occasional addition of Swedes, Moldavians, Wallachians and others, often in kaleidoscopic combinations of two or more at a time, engaged in an unending struggle. Well could the Slavs be likened to soft iron placed between a hard anvil of Asiatic mounted nomads and the weighty steel hammer of Germany. There is enough material in this well written book not only for historians, statesmen or army commanders, but also for several scenario writers, who would find new untold riches in the chapters dealing with the life and exploits of the Ukrainian Cossacks in the Zaporogian *Sich.*

It is while speaking of the Polish relief of Vienna in 1683 that the author finds that the effect of the protracted

Turkish wars was to stultify and derange the whole development of Polish political and cultural life and to prepare the way for the revival of a great Orthodox Slav state in the East and for the recrudescence of the Teutonic Knights under the Prussia of Frederick the Great—a point of view with which it is difficult to quarrel. Another telling statement is that it is hardly possible to discuss the question of a distinctive "Ukrainian" nationality and its origin before the seventeenth century.

The attempt to foist False Dmitri on the Muscovite throne in 1603 is laid at Poland's door, the inspiration being attributed to Jesuits, "who would have liked to establish a Polish nominee in Kremlin . . ." "An addiction to extremes, an obsession with the ideal is probably a fatality of the Slav character, the origins of which are to be sought in the whole of Slav history." The exploits of the Zaporogians under their celebrated Hetman Peter Sahaydachny in the early part of the seventeenth century make a reading comparable with that of Fenimore Cooper at his best. In 1680 old Ataman Sirko died. "His personality was so characteristic of his epoch and surroundings that its study may give some understanding of that amazing and contradictory medley of heroism and treason, of passionate patriotism and indifference, of cunning and naivety which made up the background of the Ukraine of the Hetmans.."

Even Peter the Great thought it at first wiser not to make any changes in this tumultuous land. According to a Kievan historian—"When politically undeveloped masses become conscious of their power they put forward those who favour their instincts." "Treason had become a sort of political tradition for Hetmans"—says another. Thus Ivan Mazeppa also could not escape turning traitor after 21 years' faithful service to Peter the Great, moreover, when on the brink of his own grave. His 'old man's love' for Maria Kochubey, daughter of the chief judge and wealthy landowner, by all accounts a lovely girl, is pathetic.

Ukrainian language may have passed through many vicissitudes, but perhaps the deepest insult was inflicted upon it by the Russian Secretary of State for Public Instruction under Tsar Alexander II, who thought it necessary to issue a circular in which it was stated that "no Little Russian language exists nor has it ever existed" and that "it is but bad Russian spoilt by Polish influences." In the four years' war another clumsy step was taken by the Russian administration who banished the Uniate Metropolitan Count Szepticki from Eastern Galicia where the population was of Russian (why not Ruthenian?) origin and "half Orthodox." There follows a full and informative account of the effect of the last war on the Ukraine and an amusing account of the rival governments after the Treaty of Brest Litovsk, when there was a veritable comedy enacted with the aid of the various delegates, including the Ukrainian 'students.'

The chapter of Economic History contains some startling facts. The density of population around Kiev was recently estimated to be 70-80 people per sq. kilometre, while in Podolia 100 years ago it reached the figure of 100. "This should have tended to discourage those Western dreamers who were even then casting envious eyes on the 'vacant land' of the Ukraine!" Just

before the last war Ukraine produced 18 per cent. of the world production of sugar beet, and thus ranked fourth. The wheat crop of Ukraine and New Russia represented 8 per cent. of the total world crop. In 1914 9 million head of cattle, 6 million sheep, 5-6 million pigs and 5½ million horses were estimated to be in that area.

The policy of the Russians is to bind the Ukraine with her heavy industries of coal and iron to other parts of the Union by discouraging the development of other branches of industry, for this might make for economic independence. The postscript on Ukraine and Europe 1939-40 contains some valuable philosophic thoughts on the present situation: The Soviet occupation of Galicia was a severe blow to the Ukrainian nationalist movement. Too late did the party leaders come to appreciate the relative tolerance of the Polish system of government. The Polish and Ukrainian questions have been potentially simplified. A revived Polish State will be a national state in federal relation to its neighbours rather than an out-moded 'state of nationalities.' The fate of the Ukraine, however, must merge with the destiny of the other nationalities under the rule of the Moscow Government. . . .

GEORGE DE SWIET.

THE GENEVA RACKET (1920-1939), by Robert Dell. *Robert Hale.* 18*s.*

Here is another black record. Mr. Robert Dell's exposure of the intrigues to which statesmen of the Great Powers, specifically Britain and France, have stooped in their manipulation of the League is as damning as any indictment of 'Germany.' It affords evidence, if such were needed, that the pot and the kettle could indulge in a fine old slanging-match about the peace-guilt—and the world be none the wiser for it. For the point is that aggression and war-making, represented as the original sin of the Germans, is inherent in the traditional context of inter-State relations, in what Lowes Dickinson first called 'the international anarchy.' And the League of Nations, established on the basis of untrammelled national sovereignty, was not merely no remedy, it could not but be the vehicle of that amoral 'diplomacy' which is the natural lubricant of power-politics.

The story of the Gadarene stampede of the past ten years is familiar enough: Manchuria, the hocus-pocus of the Disarmament Conference, Abyssinia, Non-Intervention, 'Munich'—those are only the most conspicuous milestones. Mr. Dell, for many years *Manchester Guardian* correspondent in Paris and then Geneva, is able to fit in all the small pieces that complete the tragic jig-saw, including the warning episodes of the first ten years' period, such as the "capitulation to Poland" over Vilna, to Italy over Corfu; the value of his analysis lies, particularly, in the fact that it is the first close-up of international politics taken from the outlook tower of Geneva itself by a resident correspondent who saw the whole process of development, knew everybody and was respected as a fearless seasoned veteran with no particular axe to grind. To those of us who read his acrid journalism and knew something of his stormy life the manner of the book is surprisingly sober, not to say mellow, and, for all its catchpenny title, it must rank as a serious work.

'The League' — when once 'diplomacy' had got its fangs into it, i.e., after the idealists' honeymoon of the Geneva Protocol (so-called because it was designed to supplement and complete the basis charter of the Covenant)—was for all practical purposes Britain and France, often at variance with one another but inevitably sharing the job of stage-manager at Geneva. It is the makers of policy in those countries, therefore, that must bear the blame for what the author calls in a succession of searing chapters, the capitulations — to Poland, to Mussolini, to Japan, to Hitler—and "the Betrayal of Spanish Democracy." And the British Government, in its various incarnations, stands convicted of continual unprincipled conduct, which had not even the merit of being successful! Over Sir John Simon's record with regard to Japan's invasion of Manchuria and the spokes being continually put in the French wheels—France being then spokesman for the Continent—by Simon, MacDonald and Lord Londonderry at the Disarmament Conference, it is perhaps kindest to draw a veil. But Mr. Dell shows how time and again Mr. Eden, who knew better, was compelled on instructions from London to choose some discreditable course, and he regards the visit of Lord Halifax in May, 1938, to 'arrange' for the extrusion of Abyssinia from the League, in the interests of Mr. Chamberlain's Anglo-Italian deal, as "the most disgraceful episode" in the League's history. Two points stand out from the narrative as calling for especial comment. One is the way in which the British Government showed considerable astuteness at the time of the betrayal of Abyssinia, in throwing the responsibility in the eyes of the world on M. Laval and France for what was in effect a British policy. (No wonder he doesn't like us!) London played the same trick on MM. Léon Blum and Delbos in July-August, 1936, in making it appear that the policy of "Non-Intervention" with regard to Spain originated in Paris. Formally, of course, France took the initiative in proposing non-intervention, but it was the fateful decision six days later, before any Agreement, to put an embargo on the exportation of arms and war material from France to Spain which mattered, and that was directly due to diplomatic pressure by Britain, our Ambassador in Paris declaring that, should France get into difficulties with Hitler on account of the sale of war material to Spain, Britain washed her hands of her Locarno obligations.

The other point on which this book sheds useful light is the Franco-Soviet Pact, which was never, according to the author, directed against Germany but simply "the aggressor." Apparently the cap fitted.

W. Horsfall Carter.

THE SOCIAL POLICY OF NAZI GERMANY, by C. W. Guillebaud. *Cambridge University Press.* 3*s.* 6*d.*

There are two direct and opposite approaches to the consideration of the social policy of Nazi Germany. One is by the road which Mr. William A. Robson travels in his Oxford Pamphlet *Labour Under Nazi Rule* and the other is the way indicated by Mr. Guillebaud in the present volume. Mr. Robson can see little good in Nazi measures for, overshadowing every other consideration, is the fact, to him, that from

1933 onwards the German labour movement was crushed. On the other hand Mr. Guillebaud sees plainly that in spite of some good legislation by the Weimar Republic which included the establishment of The Works Councils, there were, when Hitler came to power, nearly seven million unemployed.

Hitler solved this problem after 1934 by his war economy but before that date he had made many bold innovations which had reduced unemployment to a minimum and set up much machinery which was beneficial to the community as a whole. It is true that to take away a man's freedom and impose upon him a system which will ultimately transform him into a state slave is a grievous ill, but it is also true that many German workmen did not see Hitler's actions in this light. They saw work where there was no work and bread where there was no bread and they looked upon Hitler, not as a tyrant, but as a saviour. They saw also, or thought they saw, for it was a fallacy, the coming of a classless society in which there would be equal opportunities for all.

It is in this light that one must regard Mr. Guillebaud's short book as valuable. He makes it clear that in condemning Nazi social policy from the outside we are probably forgetting in what light it appeared from the inside. There has been in Hitler's legislation much that is enlightened, progressive, and admirable if only one can forget for a moment the motive which inspires it. One has, perhaps, no reason to forget but at the same time one must remember that many of Hitler's measures diminished poverty and increased the happiness of the whole people. One cannot afford to miss good ideas simply because Hitler thought of them first; many of them could be adapted easily enough without the aid of a rubber truncheon or at the price of a man's soul.

JOHN ARMITAGE.

MODERN NAVAL STRATEGY, by Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon and Francis E. McMurtrie. *Frederick Muller.* 8*s.* 6*d.*

WITH THE FOREIGN LEGION AT NARVIK, by Capitaine Pierre O. Lapie, translated by Anthony Merryn. *John Murray.* 5*s.*

Since France fell, the tendency of the struggle has moved away from the combat of great armies on the continental model and has turned towards amphibious warfare. For the enemy to invade this country, or for ourselves to attack the enemy is now largely a question of co-operation between the naval, military and air arms, and it is when the authors of *Modern Naval Strategy* discuss the technical problems of combined operations that they become most interesting to the general reader. The book, itself a combined effort, has the advantage of a partnership of professional knowledge and the ability to express that knowledge in words which the layman can understand. It is a familiar complaint that the average Englishman outside the service has but the vaguest notions, beyond an impression that it is all-powerful, of what the Navy can do and cannot do—of why, for example it was not able to prevent the German landings in Norway. Sir Reginald Bacon and Mr. McMurtrie give a clear picture of what lies within, and what beyond, the scope of naval action, and of the balance

of forces which decides when the navy can and cannot act. On the subject of invasion the authors see no reason why, if previous preparation is adequate, 20,000 men should not be landed on a beach, with all their equipment, within the space of half-an-hour; and they recall the Dover Patrol of 1917 whereby we had at one time hoped to land 13,000 men, tanks and vehicles within 20 minutes. Needless to say they add that any such scheme requires, as a first essential, command of the sea.

Capitaine Lapie, in his account of the part played by the French Foreign Legion at Narvik, discusses what was in effect the first successful combined operation of the war, and the first successful battle against the Germans on land. It makes heartening and instructive reading. Far too little attention has been paid to the taking of Narvik, and far too little credit given to the Legion for the part they played. The book is not, and does not set out to be, a study of the strategy of the Narvik campaign. It is a personal narrative by one of the officers, and a collection of admirable pen-portraits of his brother legionaries. As is only fitting there is a foreword by P. C. Wren; and indeed the book is full of Beau Geste in his best vein. There is one of many examples of the *esprit de corps* of the Legion in the account of an interview between the Colonel and a sergeant who had just arrived with a convoy of tractors thought to have been lost. The sergeant had taken barely three days for a long and difficult journey, cutting his own road and building bridges with trees as he went. His C.O.'s only comment, when he reports, is: "You are a Legionary." There is an equally terse sense of humour about the notice posted in the Legion's canteen: 'Alcohol kills, but the Legionary has no fear of death;' and again in the quotation from the ship's log on the journey out: 'May 1st, 8 p.m. The colonel still has hiccups. Sea calm.'

As an indication of the real capabilities of the French soldier, and of his strength in tradition and morale, the book is excellent and should be widely read.

GORDON WINTER.

SELECTED POEMS, by William Plomer. The New Hogarth Library, Vol. I. *The Hogarth Press.* 2*s.* 6*d.*

SELECTED POEMS, by C. Day Lewis. The New Hogarth Library. Vol. II. *The Hogarth Press.* 2*s.* 6*d.*

SALUTE TO VALOUR, by Stephen Gwynn. *Constable.* 6*d.*

SONGS FOR COURAGE, by Ken Etheridge. *Llandyssul: Gomerian Press.* 2*s.* 6*d.*

POEMS TO BAA, by The Rt. Hon. Godfrey Locker Lampson. *John Murray.* 3*s.* 6*d.*

One greatly welcomes in these first two volumes of the New Hogarth Library, nicely produced for half-a-crown, selections of the poetry of William Plomer and C. Day Lewis. Mr. Plomer, who from the standpoint of the future has seemed to the present reviewer one of the most significant and best poets now writing, has always stood somewhat apart from his contemporaries rather as Flecker did from his a generation ago. He has not walked into the trap of politics, although he reflects the contemporary scene in poems of brilliant, varied, and often exotic atmosphere. His selection

is hard to review in a short space because of his variety of mood and subject for he is at once exotic, compassionate, angry, tender and derisory; but he emerges well as a poet psychologically human and wittily satirical. He has knowledge of and pity for humanity. Perhaps the Poems of Africa are the best for in them he can condense in a phrase the relentless African scene, the colour, cruelty, loneliness and splendour of Africa. Where the corpse of a young negress rolled on the shore,

> We saw, heraldic in the heat,
> A scorpion on a stone.

The Poems of Japan and Greece, gaining interest from the present situation, are full of exact observation, movement and colour. In "Thoughts on the Japanese Invasion of China" and "The Russian Lover," Mr. Plomer shows his awareness of the closeness of the jungle to the veneer of civilization; in "September Evening, 1938" and "Vagabond Love," his sympathy with tender love. In "Armistice Day, 1929" he is bitter about war, as he is satirical about suburban foibles and fashionable vice in his high-spirited ballads.

In two fine metaphysical poems, "A Traveller's Tale" and "Angel Satyr" there is something of Rilke. Mr. Plomer is sincere, sensuous and passionate.

If Mr. Plomer's lines have juice in them Mr. Day Lewis' lines suggest the hardness of metal. Meeting the metallic Muse of one who began as an addict of "machine imagery" we pass from sap to dryness, an almost too conscious artistry of technique, "from feathers to iron." These devices of technique, half-rhyme, internal rhyme, alliteration, etc.—not new and somewhat naïvely expounded in *A Hope For Poetry*—often obtrude, particularly in "The Magnetic Mountain" sequence of poems and the result is seldom the art that conceals art. Again the penalty for Mr. Day Lewis' political preoccupations is that one or two poems now seem flatly out of date. How good is the opening, how disappointing the end of the poem on page 39, for example; The trouble about waiting for "zero hour" is that it may not come at all or may come differently. Some of the poet's tortured questions have already been finely resolved in a sudden up-flaming of the national spirit. Re-reading these poems one is left with the impression that Mr. Day Lewis' best books have been "From Feathers to Iron" and "A Time to Dance." In many poems such as those on pages 28, 29, 36, 42, 48 and in the ode to the Australian flyers, Parer and M'Intosh, Mr. Day Lewis reveals his integrity and austere ardour of spirit.

> As though in shadowy cave a
> Stalagmite of flame,
> The integral spirit climbs
> The dark in light for ever.

In the thirteen poems published in *Salute to Valour* Mr. Stephen Gwynn nobly expresses the high mood of the present. Yet he does more than this for his poems, written in conventional verse patterns, are more than accomplished. His belief in "our finest hour," his faith and outlook express themselves best in "To a Polish Squadron," "They Also Serve—" and "We That Are Old"; while "Stones of Greece," "Remembering France" and "The Oak Avenue" are poetic, patriotic and nostalgic.

Mr. Ken Etheridge in *Songs for*

Courage is patriotic too, and his poems reach a fairly high level of competence If his lyrics lack intensity, I liked "Poet's Faith," where the Celtic note is present. There is some nice nature description in "Brown Eyes":

Brown as peat-pools, sun on fern magic.

He is at his best in the fragments of Welsh plays at the end of the book.

Mr. Godfrey Locker Lampson writes with the accomplishment, the wit and grace of a bygone age. Most of the *Poems to Baa* are sonnets Shakespearian in form and diction, meticulous in technique. There are one or two 'Cavalier' lyrics. His romantic song celebrates love, saddened by regret for the passing of youth.

JOSEPH BRADDOCK.

LOOK AT ALL THOSE ROSES, by Elizabeth Bowen. *Gollancz.* 7*s.* 6*d.*

TODAY AND FOREVER, by Pearl Buck. *Macmillan.* 8*s.* 6*d.*

THE LAND OF SPICES, by Kate O'Brien. *Heinemann.* 8*s.* 6*d.*

Miss Bowen's is the art of Katherine Mansfield in more sophisticated, more abrupt and on the whole less kindly hands. There is an air of acute and disjointed fretfulness about these rosy-intellectual stories, so few of which can be translated into neat anecdotal terms, and they are on the whole disturbing rather than satisfying. They seem to spring from a sort of bizarre love of dissection, a dreamy and sometimes not a little malevolent interest in the odd entanglements of existence. "I love life," Katherine Mansfield once said, "but my experience of it is pretty terrible." One feels, on the other hand, that Miss Bowen might say "I hate life; but my experience of

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BY DOMINIK WEGIERSKI

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watching mankind disentangle itself from the mess is pretty interesting." Her short, sculptured sentences, in which an exquisite sensibility is constantly restrained by an almost harshly dispassionate intellect, are technically interesting but convey only rarely a sense of compassion. So one feels that sometimes Miss Bowen hates her people ; the initial pity has curdled, even soured, to surly spinsterish contempt ; the surface bloom of the style is charmingly iridescent, but the hands which polish it are cold. Yet sometimes I feel she does not intend it to be like this, that she would really like us to feel her own warm-hearted pity for the invalid girl and her mother in the rose-covered cottage, the strange couple in the derelict seashore hotel, the lovers walking on Sunday in the woods, but that intellect has defeated the courage needed for a more compassionate simplicity. Perhaps she demands a more emotional co-operation than at least one reader has found it possible to give to the cold, bright oblique beauty of these tales.

Miss Buck's stories are of modern China, mostly China at war : the generous untidy stories of a famous novelist writing for a large and perhaps rather comfortable public. Of pity and compassion there is plenty here, together with a simple eagerness to convey scenes and people that is sometimes naïve. But like all Western novelists writing of China Miss Buck gives the impression of trying to depict that inscrutable country from an immeasurable distance, and I find these stories, even at their best, only a fraction above the best magazine category.

Miss O'Brien's story of the life of an English Reverend Mother as revealed by ten years in an Irish convent of a French order has also little of that action sequence and excitement that can be easily summarized in anecdotal terms. Its beauty lies almost solely in the method of its telling. The inspiration for that method is, as in so much modern Irish fiction, French : a certain formal delicacy, a smooth warm-veined marble surface of prose, an impression of coloured austerity. One gets the same impression from reading these pages as, in fact, from gazing at a piece of carefully chosen, carefully polished marble. The delicate cool veins of thought run hither and thither, changing colour, breaking, melting, creating an intricate and yet never disordered pattern ; the calm bright surface reflects life rather than creates it. Passive, cool, explanatory, the colours of its pictures toned down, its light suffused, the book goes best perhaps into the category known as distinguished ; and is, I feel without prejudice, for the very, very few.

H. E. Bates.

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